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PUBLIC SPEAKERS: CLASSICAL RHETORIC 
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COMMENTARY 
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Arguably the contexts of speaking and writing for lawyers of ancient Greece and 
Rome and lawyers of today could not be more different.  But, classical rhetorical theo-
ry, developed 2,000 years ago for face-to-face interactions in public squares and court-
rooms, can be productively applied to improve our understanding of modern lawyers’ 
digital communication practices.  This article first argues that lawyers have an ethical 
responsibility to write as “citizen lawyers” and provide legal commentary in the digital 
public sphere. Then, applying classical rhetorical theory, this article explores the prob-
lems and possibilities of lawyers’ digital rhetoric.  The article is not a handbook of rhe-
torical techniques; rather it offers lawyers a rhetorical perspective on public commen-
tary in a digital environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Rhetoric would be a very easy and small matter, if it could be included in a 
short body of rules, but rules must generally be altered to suit the nature of 
each individual case.” 
—Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, II.13† 
OLD RHETORICS, NEW MEDIA, AND COMMENTATING ON THE LAW 
As the epigraph above identifies, in Ancient Rome nearly two millennia 
ago, Quintilian, a Roman citizen, rhetorical scholar, and lawyer,1 recognized 
that speaking to influence the thoughts and actions of others—that is, speaking 
rhetorically—was a situation-specific activity that resisted uniform rules and 
relied on the careful judgment and discernment of the speaker to adapt to the 
complexities, constraints, and conditions of those situations. Even at a time 
when rhetorical situations2 were predominantly those in-person, face-to-face 
interactions or, in some cases, in written form between those who were literate, 
Quintilian (and other classical rhetoricians) knew that every instance of persua-
 
†  This quote from Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria appears in QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING 
OF SPEAKING AND WRITING: TRANSLATIONS FROM BOOKS ONE, TWO, AND TEN OF THE 
INSTITUTIO ORATORIA xiii (James J. Murphy & Cleve Wiese eds., 2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter 
QUINTILIAN TEACHING SPEAKING & WRITING]. 
1  THE RHETORICAL TRADITION: READINGS FROM CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 38–39 
(Patricia Bizzell & Bruce Herzberg eds., 2001); see also QUINTILIAN TEACHING SPEAKING & 
WRITING, supra note †, at xiii. 
2  For a description of the “rhetorical situation,” see Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situa-
tion, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 1–2 (1968). Generally speaking, the “rhetorical situation” is 
context for a rhetorical act and includes the setting, the constraints and exigencies confront-
ing the speaker and message, and the audience who will hear the message. See id. at 5. 
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sion required adaptation and individuation if one wanted to effectively per-
suade an audience.3 
In Quintilian’s Rome as well as in ancient Greece—the birthplace of rheto-
ric—citizens and lawyers spent their time speaking and writing in and for the 
fora of the physical world.4 They argued before juries of their physically pre-
sent fellow citizens; in public squares and legislative bodies; and before judges 
in courts of law, presenting arguments about guilt and innocence, public policy, 
and even legal reform.5 Their messages, both spoken and written, were regulat-
ed and contextualized by the bounds of the physical fora in which they spoke 
(i.e., the public square, legislative bodies, and courtrooms), and were focused 
on the immediately present audience.6 For citizens and lawyers of the ancient 
western world, audiences for persuasive messages were local and messages, 
usually, fleeting. 
Quintilian’s world of persuasion appears significantly different from the 
possibilities for persuasion that confront the contemporary lawyer. While law-
yers still speak to influence and persuade others in traditional lawyering spaces, 
the lawyer’s sphere of influence has expanded beyond the courtroom, the of-
fice, and even the local newspaper to the digital public sphere—the electronic 
and computerized spaces where lawyers can speak to broader, more numerous, 
and more diverse audiences they would like to influence about legal issues of 
common concern.7 
 
3  See, e.g., JAMES A. HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIC: AN INTRODUCTION 
89–90 (5th ed. 2013) (noting that “rhetoric [in the form of ‘verbal skills’] provided a method 
for conducting political debates, undertaking trials, and addressing the citizenry on important 
topics.”). Likewise, Athenian democracy that preceded the Roman Empire required that an 
individual have the “speaking skill” for public influence, and Athenian males needed the 
“ability to listen, understand, and speak about deliberative and judicial affairs.” See id. at 
28–29. The Greek Sophist, Isocrates, helped transform Greek culture from primarily oral to 
literate “where speaking and writing were emphasized equally.” JAMES J. MURPHY ET AL., A 
SYNOPTIC HISTORY OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC 52 (4th ed., Routledge 2014) (1983). 
4  See generally the discussion in THE RHETORICAL TRADITION, supra note 1, at 19–21. 
5  See HERRICK, supra note 3, at 89–92 (describing the places and kinds of argument in the 
Greek and Roman traditions). 
6  See id. 
7  The concept of a “public sphere” is not a new idea. Jürgen Habermas theorized the public 
sphere as a private people gathered together to convey to the government the needs of the 
state. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN 
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 27–31 (Thomas Burger & Frederick 
Lawrence trans., 1989). Rhetoric scholar Gerard Hauser defines the public sphere as “a dis-
cursive space in which individuals and groups associate to discuss matters of mutual interest 
and, where possible, to reach a common judgment about them.” GERARD A. HAUSER, 
VERNACULAR VOICES: THE RHETORIC OF PUBLICS AND PUBLIC SPHERES 61 (1999). The idea 
of the “digital public sphere,” while newer in origin, is not without controversy about its 
characteristics and accessibility. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four 
Principles for Digital Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 
1358–60 (2018) (warning of the dangers of romanticizing the internet as a new “town 
square” and encouraging differentiation between various forms of digital media when con-
sidering the accessibility and treatment of digital spaces). 
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In digital public spaces, like the internet, lawyers speak as legal educators, 
social influencers, public policy commentators, and service marketers. In the 
digital world, there is virtually no limit to the ways lawyers can present (and re-
present) themselves or the audiences lawyers can reach with their messages. 
The messages can be visual, oral, or textual; they can resist linearity, coher-
ence, and closure; and audiences can use messages in whole or in part for pur-
poses unanticipated and unregulated.8 Messages are easily attainable, readable, 
and translatable,9 and the rate of a message’s circulation is infinite and quan-
tum—messages fly across the virtual world in ways unknown before communi-
cation became electronically connected.10 Lawyers today function in a complex 
communication world that requires constant adaptation to audiences and speak-
ing situations. Reading Quintilian’s thoughts above suggests that he might have 
anticipated these changes in his classical view of rhetoric because he recog-
nized that one must constantly adapt to effectively engage new audiences in 
new situations. 
One might argue there could not be much that is more different about the 
lawyers of the classical period in ancient Greece and Rome speaking and writ-
ing in the Greek agora and the courtrooms of Rome and today’s lawyers speak-
ing and writing in the digital public sphere. But classical rhetorical theory11 can 
be productively applied to better understand lawyers’ writing in the digital pub-
lic sphere. In other words, if we did not know better, Quintilian might have 
been commenting on the rhetorical experiences of lawyers speaking digitally 
today. 
WHAT THIS ARTICLE IS ABOUT 
This Article is an initial foray into—not an exhaustive treatment of—the 
problems and possibilities for lawyers writing commentary about the law in the 
digital public. This exploration connects digital rhetorical theory—theory about 
messages that are electronic or computerized—and classical rhetorical theory 
with the messages of the citizen lawyer—a lawyer as public speaker who has 
ethical responsibility to publicly address issues of justice, including legal edu-
cation, law reform, and rule of law.12 Making these connections is meant to 
 
8  See discussion infra Part II. 
9  See infra Section II.C. 
10  See infra Section II.C. 
11  The classical rhetorical period is defined as the time from the birth of rhetoric in ancient 
Greece, about the fourth century B.C.E., to about 400 C.E. See THE RHETORICAL TRADITION, 
supra note 1, at 2, 19. 
12  For the discussion of how the “citizen lawyer” concept is grounded in the Preamble of the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, see infra Section I.B. 
Others have discussed the idea of the citizen lawyer. See, e.g., Ann L. Schiavone, Writing 
the Law: Developing the “Lawyer Citizen” Identity Through Legislative, Statutory, and Rule 
Drafting Courses, 55 DUQ. L. REV. 119, 120–21, 123–24 (2017) (noting the origins of the 
term with Thomas Jefferson and defining citizen lawyer as one that “in some way, take[s] 
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stimulate thought and critique about how applying classical rhetoric to contem-
porary lawyer speech in the digital public can provide a more robust perspec-
tive on how lawyers might craft effective digital “public commentary.” 
For the purposes of this Article, both the digital sphere, where lawyers 
might share their messages with audiences, and the lawyers’ messages them-
selves, are treated as intentionally “public.”13 In other words, the Article begins 
with the premise that the messages relevant to this Article are those messages a 
lawyer writes that are intended for consumption by public, not private, audi-
ences. The Article presumes citizen lawyers’ messages mean to engage the 
public not necessarily on behalf of clients but to influence public thinking, 
through education or argument, on legal issues. Examples of these kind of pub-
lic messages are what one might call, as Jennifer Murphy Romig has, “public 
legal writing,” which includes, for example, blogs about legal issues or law re-
form, tweets about the most recent Supreme Court case, or online articles in a 
lawyer’s area of expertise.14 
This Article also distinguishes these messages as “public” because they 
appear in the digital “public sphere” rather than in the “technical sphere” of le-
gal practice.15 In the public sphere, the internet has opened new avenues for 
lawyers to influence the public on legal issues with the stroke of a key and a 
connection to the internet.16 In the technical sphere, however, lawyers’ audi-
ences are not public: in the technical sphere, lawyers speak for example, to ju-
ries and judges in courtrooms and clients in the privacy of their offices.17 
 
responsibility for their role in promoting the public good through development and reform of 
law.”). 
13  Scholar Michael Warner explores the meaning of a “public” in his work and offers a defi-
nition particularly useful for digital publics: a “public that comes into being only in relation 
to texts and their circulation.” See, e.g., Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (Ab-
breviated Version), in CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL THEORY: A READER 257 (Mark J. Por-
rovecchio & Celeste Michelle Condit eds., 2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY 
RHETORICAL THEORY]. In the spirit of Warner’s definition, for the purposes of this Article, 
the “public” refers to an ever-transforming body of readers and listeners who engage with a 
lawyer’s commentary through digital media. This “public” is made up of more than those 
who are “official” legal discourse participants, like lawyers and judges. For this Article, 
“public” commentary is that which is intended for any audience who can access the mes-
sage. 
14  See Jennifer Murphy Romig, Legal Blogging and the Rhetorical Genre of Public Legal 
Writing, 12 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 29, 29 (2015) (defining “public legal writing” as 
“writing by lawyers not for any specific client but for dissemination to the public or through 
wide distribution channels, particularly the internet.”). 
15  See G. Thomas Goodnight, The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A 
Speculative Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation, in CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL 
THEORY, supra note 13, at 202 (describing argument in public, technical, and personal 
spheres). 
16  See Romig, supra note 14, at 30 (noting that “public legal writing has never been easier: 
technology enables lawyers and everyone else to readily [communicate with the public]”). 
17  See Goodnight, supra note 15, at 202. Goodnight describes the public sphere as one 
which transcends the private and technical spheres and is not reducible to any particular pro-
fessional communities or social customs. Id. He describes the “technical” sphere, on the oth-
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Speaking to “public” audiences in the “public sphere” is the focus of this Arti-
cle; speaking to and for exclusively technical legal audiences through technical 
legal messages is outside the Article’s scope.18 
Finally, this Article focuses on citizen lawyers as “commentators” making 
legal “commentary” in the digital public sphere. The Preamble to the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct defines one of the lawyer’s roles as the role of 
citizen lawyer: a “public citizen” with a “special responsibility” for justice.19 In 
that role, lawyers arguably are expected to engage in public discourse, or in 
other words, to be commentators on the law.20 As described below, the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA), in connection with the ethical rules for lawyer 
conduct, has identified “lawyer commentary” as a category of lawyer speech.21 
The distinction between a commentator and a commenter is important for 
talking about discourse in the digital world. A “commentator” is “someone who 
provides commentary,” defined as “a series of remarks, explanations, and in-
terpretations.”22 This is different from a “commenter,” a term most often used 
to refer to someone who makes an isolated, perhaps less well-thought-out re-
mark or “comment” online.23 Arguably, a more extensive “comment,” one that 
provides greater depth of explanation, could be considered “commentary,” 
even if it appears in a digital space for “comments,” such as at the bottom of a 
blog entry. 
HOW THE ARTICLE PROCEEDS 
The Article starts by introducing how the ABA’s Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (Model Rules) describe the role of the lawyer as a “public citi-
zen” with a special responsibility for justice. Then it introduces the ABA’s re-
cent ethics opinion that identifies a new category of lawyer speech, “public 
commentary,” which expressly includes online or digital commentary.24 The 
 
er hand, as one “where more limited rules of evidence, presentation, and judgment are stipu-
lated in order to identify arguers of the field and to facilitate the pursuit of their interests.” 
Id. 
18  This is not to say, however, that documents written for official court audiences cannot 
also be documents written for the public. Certainly, a good lawyer knows that, because of 
digital technology, documents written for courts, legislatures, and other regulatory bodies are 
always and irrevocably written (or should be written) for public audiences. 
19  See infra note 27 and discussion infra Section I.B. 
20  See Kirsten K. Davis, Rhetorical Criticism as Essential Legal Skill: Some Thoughts on 
Developing Lawyers as ‘Public Citizens’, 16 COMM. L. REV. 43, 48 (2016) (“Trained as rhe-
torical critics, lawyers can better perform as public citizens, unpacking the complications in 
the language of rules and policies, explaining those complications, offering and arguing for 
justice based upon their evaluation of the moral valence of the law.”). 
21  See infra Section I.A. 
22  See, e.g., Commentator vs. Commenter, GRAMMARIST, http://grammarist.com/usage/ 
commentator-commenter [https://perma.cc/A77J-HBEH] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
23  See id. 
24  See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 480 (2018) [he 
reinafter ABA Formal Opinion], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin 
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Article then connects that commentary to the lawyer’s public citizen role. This 
Part of the Article argues that lawyers should consider themselves public 
speakers as well as client advocates and that the availability and ubiquity of 
digital media demands that lawyers communicate digitally to the public about 
issues like legal reform, rule of law, and social justice. 
To fulfill their unique ethical commitment to speak publicly on legal topics 
and, perhaps, to use the digital public sphere to do so (although this commit-
ment is not enforceable through professional discipline), lawyers must under-
stand “digital rhetoric.” Thus, the next Part highlights the features of digital 
rhetoric and how lawyers’ public commentary might be seen as a type of digital 
rhetoric. Finally, the Article explores the connection between digital rhetoric, 
modern lawyers producing digital public commentary, and classical rhetorical 
theory. The goal of this final Part is to apply classical rhetoric to lawyers’ digi-
tal public commentary to explore the possibilities, problems, opportunities, and 
constraints of a digital public commentary genre of legal writing.25 
This Article is not a Rhetorica Ad Herennium26 handbook of recipe-like in-
structions to guide lawyers on how to use rhetorical techniques in the digital 
sphere. Instead, the Article offers a rhetorical perspective on what lawyers 
might understand about themselves, their ethical responsibilities, their messag-
es, their purposes, their communication media, and their audiences when com-
mentating digitally. This Article does what Quintilian urged classical rhetors to 
do 2,000 years ago: consider how their rhetorical sensibilities might need to 
adapt to fit new rhetorical situations. 
 
istrative/professional_responsibility/aba_formal_opinion_480.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX6Q-2 
WB8]. 
25  What makes a group of texts amount to a rhetorical genre? A genre exists when a “con-
stellation of elements” of rhetorical artifacts are sufficiently similar that they can be placed 
in the same classification. See Karlyn Kohrs Campbell & Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Form and 
Genre in Rhetorical Criticism: An Introduction, in FORM AND GENRE: SHAPING RHETORICAL 
ACTION 21 (Karlyn Kohrs Campbell & Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 1978). The artifacts of 
a particular genre share “substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics.” Id. For a dif-
ferent view on genre as form of action and motivation rather than as the physical characteris-
tics of texts, see Carolyn R. Miller, Genre as Social Action, 70 Q. J. SPEECH 151 (1984). For 
an exploration of legal blogging as rhetorical genre, see Romig, supra note 14. 
26  [CICERO], RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM, (Harry Caplan trans., Harvard Univ. Press Report 
1964). This text is thought to be “the earliest Roman systematic rhetoric” and was written in  
the first century B.C.E. Silva Rhetoricae, Rhetorica ad Herennium (1st Cent. B.C.), rheto-
ric.byu.edu/Primary%20Texts/Ad%20Herennium.htm [https://perma.cc/5A2R-DNLM] (last  
visited Mar. 8, 2020). It was influential from the Roman period through the Renaissance. Id. 
It provided extensive textbook-like information on types and parts of oratory, particularly 
judicial oratory, and in its fourth book, it provided an extensive list of figures of speech. Id. 
Although scholars originally attributed the text to Cicero, its authorship is now considered 
unknown. See Caplan’s introduction to [CICERO], supra, at vii–ix (“It is wisest, I believe, to 
ascribe the work to an unknown author.”). 
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I. DIGITAL PUBLIC COMMENTARY, THE CITIZEN LAWYER, AND CLASSICAL 
RHETORIC’S CONTRIBUTION TO LEGAL ETHICS 
The Preamble to the ABA’s Model Rules describes one of the roles of the 
lawyer as a “public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of jus-
tice.”27 This role entails an obligation to improve the law, improve access to 
justice, promote the rule of law, and further the values of democracy.28 In the 
digital public sphere, lawyers can use their legal expertise to influence, educate, 
and lead in the public in ways that go beyond face-to-face interactions in offic-
es, boardrooms, and courtrooms and written communications in print books, 
magazines, and newspapers.29 A recent ABA Formal Ethics Opinion defined 
this kind of public speaking as lawyer “public commentary” and specifically 
included digital forms of communication in the category.30 Effectively, the 
Model Rules and the Ethics Opinion, read together, describe a specific speaker 
role, the citizen lawyer, delivering a specific type of message, “public commen-
tary.” 
A. Lawyers’ Digital Public Commentary 
A 2018 Formal Ethics Opinion by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility considered for the first time how a blogging 
lawyer must treat the confidentiality of client information.31 In deciding that the 
Model Rules applied to blogging, the ABA defined a category of lawyer speech 
it named “communicat[ion] about legal topics in public commentary.”32 The 
opinion recognized that while lawyers have historically “comment[ed] on legal 
topics in various formats” through “education[al] programs” and “articles and 
chapters in traditional print media such as magazines, treatises, law firm white 
papers, and law reviews,” the “newest format [for comments] is online publica-
tions such as blogs, listserves [sic], online articles, website postings, and brief 
online statements or microblogs (such as Twitter®).”33 The Committee noted 
that “[o]nline public commentary provides a way [for lawyers] to share 
knowledge, opinions, experiences, and news.”34 
Although the ABA was examining lawyer public commentary from the 
perspective of the ethical constraints imposed on lawyers in the digital public, 
it established that lawyer public commentary in digital spaces also has rhetori-
cal implications. But is digital public commentary more than an ethical possi-
bility for lawyers who choose to speak this way? Or could digital public com-
 
27  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. no. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
28  Id. at pmbl. no. 6. 
29  See Romig, supra note 14, at 30–31. 
30  ABA Formal Opinion, supra note 24, at 1. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
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mentary be an ethical responsibility of lawyers? Because the Model Rules cast 
the lawyer in the role of a citizen with a special responsibility for justice, digi-
tal public commentary might be not only an option for legal communication but 
also an expectation for modern lawyering. 
B. The Preamble: Lawyer as Citizen Lawyer 
The Preamble to the ABA’s Model Rules is a “general orientation”35 to “a 
lawyer’s responsibilities.”36 In its first paragraph, the Preamble states that not 
only are lawyers “representative[s] of clients” and “officer[s] of the legal sys-
tem,” they are also “public citizen[s] having special responsibility for the 
quality of justice.”37 As special citizen lawyers, lawyers have, among other re-
sponsibilities, the responsibility to improve the law, to promote the rule of law, 
and to further the values of participatory democracy.38 
As public citizens with a responsibility to improve the law, lawyers are ex-
pected to turn their attention away from individual clients and instead focus 
their attention on the central role that lawyers play in society regarding the rule 
of law.39 The Preamble says that “a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the 
law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law[,] 
and work to strengthen legal education.”40 The Preamble also asserts that as a 
citizen with the obligation to promote the rule of law and further the values of 
participatory democracy, the “lawyer should further the public’s understanding 
of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal insti-
tutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and sup-
 
35  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope no. 21 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
36  Id. at pmbl. no.1. 
37  Id. (emphasis added). 
38  Id. at pmbl. no. 6. Model Rule 6.1(b)(3), the Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service Rule, 
says that lawyers should, as part of the aspiration to annually provide pro bono legal ser-
vices, provide services through “participation in activities for improving the law, the legal 
system or the legal profession.” Id. r. 6.1(b)(3). Comment 8 to rule 6.1 describes these activi-
ties to include, among “the many activities that fall within” the rule, “acting as a continuing 
legal education instructor,” and “lobbying to the improve the law.” Id. r. 6.1 cmt. 8. 
39  Other scholars have discussed these concepts as well. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, 
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 14 (1993) (expressing con-
cern for the demise of the lawyer as a citizen with broader public interests); Bruce A. Green 
& Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: The Lawyer as Civics Teacher 
in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 1211 (2009) (describing the citizen 
lawyer as “the idea of the lawyer as patriotic leader outside the everyday professional work 
of representing clients.”); James E. Moliterno, A Golden Age of Civic Involvement: The Cli-
ent-Centered Disadvantage for Lawyers Acting as Public Officials, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1261, 1262 (2009) (defining citizen lawyer as “the lawyer in public life, government office, 
or leadership in a profession’s organizations.”); Schiavone, supra note 12, at 120–21, 123. 
40  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. no. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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port to maintain their authority.”41 Relatedly, the Preamble ends by reminding 
lawyers that they “play a vital role in the preservation of society.”42 
The take-away from the Preamble’s guidance is that the lawyer should 
speak not only privately as a client advocate, but publicly as a citizen lawyer 
addressing the legal issues of the day. This is not to say the state courts, as reg-
ulators of the legal profession, can compel a lawyer to speak in public as a citi-
zen lawyer.43 But, the implication of the Preamble is that a lawyer has a profes-
sional responsibility to perform as a public speaker—a legal educator, a law 
reformer, a public intellectual of sorts, who furthers understanding and confi-
dence in the rule of law.44 This activity requires some involvement beyond the 
legal technical sphere into the public sphere where messages can reach a 
broader audience.45 And while a lawyer could fulfill this responsibility by writ-
ing for a newspaper or giving only in-person public talks,46 that approach in 
modern digital society is largely anachronistic because of the reach of digital 
messages;47 a robust fulfillment of the citizen-lawyer role arguably requires at 
least some digital rhetorical performances. If the goal of the citizen lawyer is to 
educate the public, shore up public support for the rule of law, and preserve so-
ciety, citizen lawyers must meet the public where they are—online. 
While the Preamble creates the role of the citizen lawyer, the Model Rules 
that follow say very little to guide the lawyer on how to speak as a citizen law-
yer. Instead, the Model Rules focus on limiting the lawyer’s public speech 
about matters concerning clients. For example, Rule 1.6 insists lawyers main-
 
41  Id. 
42  Id. at pmbl. no. 13. 
43  Because of their professional status, Lawyers’ rights to free speech under the First 
Amendment are more limited in comparison to members of the public. Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on the Lawyers’ 
First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 (1998). For example, lawyers are 
ethically prohibited in certain circumstances from making certain statements to the press. 
See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991). They are prohibited 
from making false or misleading advertisements. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 
433 U.S. 350, 381–82 (1977). Although courts are generally more deferential to the states in 
limiting the speech of lawyers for public protection purposes, Sullivan, supra, at 580, it is 
unlikely that a court would permit a state bar to compel lawyers to engage in any specific 
kind of public speech. For example, the United States Supreme Court held that a state bar 
association could collect mandatory bar dues from lawyers and use them for activities relat-
ed to regulating the legal profession and improving legal services, but it violated the First 
Amendment to use those same dues for other political or ideological positions the bar want-
ed to support. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1990). 
44  Scholars have also recognized that “lawyers are sometimes perceived as classic speakers 
in public discourse . . . .” Sullivan, supra note 43, at 569. 
45  See Davis, supra note 20, at 46 (arguing that lawyers have a duty to “manage[] discourse 
in the public sphere consistent with virtuous deliberative engagement and democracy [and] 
as public citizens [to] create space in the public sphere for substantive engagement.”). 
46  See Romig, supra note 14, at 29 (noting that “[p]ublic legal writing is not new”). 
47  See infra Section II.C (discussing the greater circulation, range, and speed of digital mes-
sages). 
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tain the confidentiality of client information,48 and Rule 3.6 prohibits lawyers 
from making public statements that have a “substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding” when the lawyer is participating in the 
legal matter.49 
Moreover, the Model Rules impose a duty of technological competence on 
lawyers, but this duty does not address how lawyers can speak competently to 
the public while using digital technology.50 Rather, the rules simply state that a 
lawyer’s competence with digital technology is satisfied by “keep[ing] abreast 
of . . . the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”51 In the ab-
sence of guidance in the Model Rules, classical rhetorical theory can help law-
yers gain a perspective on and adopt effective strategies for speaking in the dig-
ital public.52 
C. What Classical Rhetorical Theory Adds to Our Understanding of the 
Citizen Lawyer as Public Commentator 
Classical rhetoric provided the foundation for civic participation and legal 
argument in Greek and Roman democracies.53 The classical rhetorical theorists 
described the rhetor as one who spoke in situations that demanded a call to ac-
tion related to public policy and the common good.54 Classical rhetoric, then, 
may be useful for theorizing the citizen lawyer in the role of public commenta-
tor. 
 
48  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
49  Id. r. 3.6. 
50  Id. r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (“To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill [required to be competent 
as a lawyer], a lawyer should [know] . . . the benefits and risks associated with relevant 
technology . . . .”). 
51  Id. 
52  If we think of lawyers speaking in public as practicing “digital rhetoric” (see discussion 
infra), Elizabeth Losh suggests that “basic competence” would mean “to understand the 
conventions of many new digital genres . . . [as] specific[ally] and socially regulated forms 
of digital text that are composed as files of electronic code.” ELIZABETH LOSH, 
VIRTUALPOLITIK: AN ELECTRONIC HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT MEDIA-MAKING IN A TIME OF 
WAR, SCANDAL, DISASTER, MISCOMMUNICATION, AND MISTAKES 54 (2009); see also 
DOUGLAS EYMAN, DIGITAL RHETORIC: THEORY, METHOD, PRACTICE 37 (2015) (quoting 
LOSH, supra). Competency might also involve understanding how ideologies are reproduced 
and reflected in digital genres and texts. Id. (citing LOSH, supra, at 56). Competency in digi-
tal rhetoric might also relate to Model Rule 8.4(g), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging 
in conduct that is “discriminat[ory] . . . in conduct related to the practice of law.” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). Comment 4 states that 
“[c]onduct related to the practice of law includes . . . business or social activities in connec-
tion with the practice of law.” Id. r. 8.4 cmt. 4. 
53  See THE RHETORICAL TRADITION, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
54  See CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL THEORY, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that teachers of 
classical rhetoric thought to be essential the ability to contribute to debates of public policy 
and community matters). 
20 NEV. L.J. 1137 
1148 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
For example, the Sophist55 Isocrates, teaching rhetoric during the Golden 
Age of Greece, suggested that the point of rhetoric was to move people to ac-
tion for the common good.56 The purpose of educating rhetors, then, was to 
prepare them for success in both courts and as public leaders.57 
Isocrates’s writings seem to anticipate today’s lawyers providing public 
commentary on the legal issues of the day; he recognized the connection be-
tween effective rhetoric and a duty to speak in pursuit of justice: 
[W]e have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; 
and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power 
of speech has not helped us establish. . . . [A good rhetor] will [not] support 
causes which are unjust or petty or devoted to private quarrels, [but rather the 
rhetor will speak to those things which are] great and honourable, devoted to the 
welfare of man and our common good.58 
Roman rhetoric emphasized engagement. Quintilian, for example, defined 
a good orator as one who engaged in the discussions of the state—one must be 
a “true statesman,” not withdrawn from life but engaged with it, practice and 
experience.59 Contemporary rhetorical scholar Celeste Condit notes that “[t]he 
ability to contribute to public policy debates and to affect the direction and life 
of the community through public discourse was taken by classical teachers of 
rhetoric as an essential attribute . . . .”60 
The Preamble to the Model Rules gives citizen lawyers an implicit respon-
sibility to publicly comment on matters of social importance, and classical rhe-
torical theory takes the view that rhetoric is the foundation of public engage-
ment on issues of public policy and the common good. Classical rhetoric and 
lawyer commentary that educates the public about the law and speaks to mat-
ters of public concern are connected; thus, classical rhetoric has something to 
offer lawyers in enacting their roles as citizen lawyers. Because the digital pub-
 
55  “The Sophists were a diverse group of early philosophers who were interested in explor-
ing all branches of knowledge.” THE RHETORICAL TRADITION, supra note 1, at 22. They took 
the position that “[c]ertainty or absolute truth is not available to humans, . . . but probable 
knowledge” gained through offering and examining arguments is. Id. How does one pro-
nounce “Sophist”? The Cambridge Dictionary says that in American English, the “o” is pro-
nounced with a short vowel sound; in British English, the “o” is a long vowel sound. See 
Sophist, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/pronunciation/english 
/sophist [https://perma.cc/7KED-3FD6] (last visited Feb. 28, 2020). 
56  THE RHETORICAL TRADITION, supra note 1, at 67. For an overview of Isocrates rhetorical 
approach and teachings, see JAMES J. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 51–54. 
57  See JAMES J. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 51 (“Isocrates believed that rhetoric must be 
devoted not only to training for the law courts but to training statesmen who will speak for 
the benefit of the entire Greek culture.”). 
58  ANTIDOSIS, in 2 ISOCRATES 327, 339 (George Norlin trans., 1929). Excerpts of Antidosis 
appear in THE RHETORICAL TRADITION, supra note 1, at 75–77. 
59  QUINTILIAN, 12 INSTITUTES OF ORATORY ch. 2 (John Selby Watson trans., 1856), in THE 
RHETORICAL TRADITION, supra note 1, at 419 [hereinafter QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTES OF 
ORATORY]. 
60  CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL THEORY, supra note 13, at 2. 
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lic sphere is the place where lawyers are likely to reach the public with their 
commentary,61 the Article now turns to the concept of “digital rhetoric” and its 
problems and possibilities for citizen lawyers. 
II. DIGITAL RHETORIC: NEW MEDIA, NEW AND OLD RHETORICS, NEW 
FEATURES 
This Part discusses how scholars have defined and described “digital rheto-
ric” and then explores four features of digital rhetoric and explains how they 
are related to lawyer commentary in the digital public sphere. 
“Digital” for the purposes of “digital rhetoric,” means rhetoric that is elec-
tronic or computerized.62 “Digital” can also refer to new forms of communica-
tion produced with new forms of technology.63 Digital communication funda-
mentally involves speakers producing and audiences receiving messages, 
which is the purview of rhetoric.64 This has led to scholars considering what the 
term “digital rhetoric” means. Digital rhetoric has no single unifying theory.65 
Instead, digital rhetoric theory is influenced by ideas coming from disciplines 
as far ranging as computational studies, mathematics, media studies, and, of 
course, rhetoric.66 For example, digital rhetoric scholar Elizabeth Losh posits 
four different and alternative definitions for digital rhetoric: (1) “[t]he conven-
tions of new digital genres that are used for everyday discourse”; (2) public 
rhetoric, “represented or recorded through digital technology and disseminated 
via electronic distributed networks”; (3) “[t]he emerging scholarly discipline 
concerned with the rhetorical interpretation of computer-generated media as 
objects of study”; and (4) “[m]athematical theories of communication.”67 
For the purposes of citizen lawyers’ digital public commentary, the first 
two of the four definitions provide the most explanatory power. As the ABA 
 
61  See Laura J. Gurak & Smiljana Antonijevic, Digital Rhetoric and Public Discourse, in 
THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF RHETORICAL STUDIES 497 (Andrea A. Lunsford et al. eds., 2009) 
(calling the phrase “digital rhetoric” redundant because no communication is “beyond the 
realm of the digital” and noting this is the “ubiquitous digital age”). 
62  EYMAN, supra note 52, at 18. “Digital” can also mean “coded differences,” as opposed to 
“analog,” which means “a continuous range of values.” Id. at 18–19. It also refers to the con-
tent of any message represented with 1s and 0s. Id. at 19. Digital messages are different from 
analog messages in that they can be easily replicated and compressed, and they can be more 
securely transmitted. Id. 
63  See id. at 17–18. 
64  “[T]he definition of ‘rhetoric’ is itself a highly contested concept, and its meaning has 
varied widely, both across the ages and within any given time period.” CONTEMPORARY 
RHETORICAL THEORY, supra note 13, at 1. However, “rhetoricians agree that . . . every rheto-
ric [(meaning ‘message’)] is always in some ways addressed to some audience that it seeks 
to influence or persuade.” Id. at 10. 
65  EYMAN, supra note 52, at 61 (“[T]here is such a wide range of digital domains and con-
texts that digital rhetoric . . . should be viewed as a field that engages multiple theories and 
methods rather than as a singular theory framework.”). 
66  See id. passim. 
67  Id. at 37 (citing LOSH, supra note 52, at 47–48). 
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noted in its Ethics Opinion discussed above, digital media offer lawyers a new 
way of commenting on the law for public consumption.68 Accordingly, we 
might think of this type of writing as a new type of legal writing, “digital public 
commentary,” that requires competence in identifying and understanding the 
unique conventions, if any, for writing in this medium, which is meant for pub-
lic audiences.69 
Another way to understand digital rhetoric is to see it as “the application of 
rhetorical theory,” both classical and contemporary, “to digital texts and per-
formances” for both analyzing and producing digital messages.70 While some 
scholars argue that digital rhetoric represents a “fundamental paradigm shift”71 
in rhetoric, others have relied heavily on classical rhetoric as a way to under-
stand the production of rhetoric in the digital environment.72 That is, although 
digital rhetoric can be seen as asserting a “new canon,” it can also be seen as 
drawing upon the rhetorical constructs of the “2,000-year-old tradition that 
constitutes the field of Western rhetoric.”73 In other words, the classical rhetor-
ical canon can be a productive lens for studying digital rhetoric. As Richard 
Lanham notes, “[r]hetoric has been the central repository of wisdom on how 
we make sense of and use information since the Greeks first invented it some-
time in the middle of the last millennium [before the common era].”74 
A final way for understanding digital rhetoric is as a “secondary orality,” a 
deployment of an oral consciousness amid a dominant literate (written) one.75 
Theorist Walter Ong suggested that three stages of consciousness exist in rela-
tion to the way in which we communicate: “primary orality,” “literacy,” and 
“secondary orality.”76 “Primary orality”77 existed before the emergence of a 
 
68  ABA Formal Opinion, supra note 24, at 1 (“Lawyers comment on legal topics in various 
formats. The newest format is online publications . . . .”). 
69  See Romig, supra note 14, at 29–30 (explaining a related discussion of her thoughts on 
identifying the genre of “public legal writing”). Her work, while related, is focused more on 
genre analysis and less on the idea of digital rhetoric as a perspective. 
70  EYMAN, supra note 52, at 13. 
71  Id. at 38 (quoting LOSH, supra note 52, at 84). 
72  See, e.g., id. at 63–71; see also KATHLEEN E. WELCH, ELECTRIC RHETORIC: CLASSICAL 
RHETORIC, ORALISM, AND A NEW LITERACY 6 (1999) (applying the teachings of Isocrates to 
the digital environment). 
73  Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 499; see also EYMAN, supra note 52, at 37 (noting 
that digital rhetoric can be seen as “the employment of rhetorical techniques in digital 
texts.”). 
74  RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION: STYLE AND SUBSTANCE IN THE AGE 
OF INFORMATION xiii (2006). 
75  See WELCH, supra note 72, at 65. (“[L]iteracy does not cancel out orality.”). 
76  See WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD 10–12 
(1982) (discussing the relationship between these terms); WELCH, supra note 72, at 57–58 
(discussing Ong’s work). 
77  Primary orality existed in cultures . . . where consciousness was formed by reliance on oral dis-
course . . . . Primary orality is a dominant kind of consciousness and is characterized by an em-
phasis on speaking not only for instrumentalist communication but for the transmission of cul-
tural values, norms, and behaviors . . . . 
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culture based on writing and had discursive features such as “formulas, repeti-
tion, [and] the addition of phrases . . . , concreteness . . . , agonistic verbal be-
havior, and audience participation.”78 Literate consciousness, which relied on 
the invention of the phonetic alphabet, introduced a new way of thinking that 
relied on abstraction, analysis, and writing to examine and reflect on the 
world.79 
“Secondary orality” relies on a form of consciousness that exists within the 
dominantly literate culture.80 It is a deliberate and self-conscious orality, based 
permanently on the use of writing and print because it is less ephemeral than 
the purely spoken word.81 A secondary orality consciousness came into being 
through the emergence of electronic technologies for communication in the 
mid-nineteenth century.82 Secondary orality places a “new emphasis on the ear 
and a change in the emphasis on the eye.”83 Kathleen Welch explains that cul-
ture has returned to a kind of orality because 
[t]he spoken word is now electrified, instantaneous, repetitive, and so familiar 
that we have normalized it. . . . Like the air, it exists and sustains us and is us. 
Secondary orality is “present-day high-technology culture, in which a new orali-
ty is sustained by telephone, radio, television, and other electronic devices that 
depend for their existence and functioning on writing and print.”84 
At least one scholar argues that the internet is evidence that society is in a 
post-literate/secondary orality period; unlike during the “Gutenberg Parenthe-
sis,” when knowledge was formed through literate practices, contemporary 
knowledge is formed through secondary orality on the internet.85 Kathleen 
Welch further observes that communication in the digital space is a form of 
“new merger of the written and the oral,” which can be theorized through clas-
sical rhetoric.86 Similarly, Elizabeth Losh writes that “classical rhetoric that fo-
 
WELCH, supra note 72, at 57. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  See ONG, supra note 76, at 10–12. 
81  Id. at 133; Liliana Bounegru, Secondary Orality in Microblogging, MASTERS OF MEDIA 
(Oct. 13, 2008), www.mastersofmedia.hum.uva.nl./blog/2008/10/13/secondary-orality-in-mi 
croblogging [https://perma.cc/Q7XP-DV6D]. 
82  WELCH, supra note 72 at 58 (discussing Ong’s theory of secondary orality). 
83  Id. 
84  Id. (quoting ONG, supra note 76, at 10–11). 
85  See Tom Pettitt, Before the Gutenberg Parenthesis: Elizabethan-American Compatibili-
ties, ACADEMIA.EDU 2–3 (2007), https://www.academia/edu/2946207/Before_the_Guten 
berg_Parenthesis_Elizabethan-American_Compatabilities [https://perma.cc/HB8K-RTHY]  
(describing the Gutenberg parenthesis as “original,” “individual,” “autonomous,” “stable,” 
and “canonical,” and describing the “post-parenthetical” as “sampling,” “remixing,” “bor-
rowing,” “reshaping,” “appropriating,” and “recontextualizing”). 
86  WELCH, supra note 72, at 104. Eyman criticizes Welch’s view as “too limiting” because it 
does not “move[] beyond print literacy.” EYMAN, supra note 52, at 42. 
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cuses on public oratory, . . . may be remarkably relevant” to studying digital 
rhetoric.87 
Some digital rhetoric scholars suggest that the rules of orality apply more 
directly to the digital space than the rules of written communication because 
the unique features of the digital space make communicating within it more 
like speaking than writing.88 Twitter, for example, shares features of both 
speaking and writing—in fact, it might be characterized as speaking in the form 
of writing. That is, although tweets are written and read, tweets “feel” more like 
words spoken in a conversational tone.89 And, like the publicly spoken word, a 
tweet is a “rapid communication with large groups of people in a speed that . . . 
resemble[s] oral storytelling, without having to share the same physical space 
with [the] audience.”90 
For lawyers as public commentators, four features of digital rhetoric91 pre-
sent new challenges and opportunities for educating and interacting with the 
public about legal issues: (1) the virtual nature of speakers, audiences, and 
messages; (2) the interactivity of speakers and audiences; (3) the circulation 
and reach of messages; and (4) the challenges digital environments present for 
both invention and memory. 
A. Speakers, Audiences, and Messages are Virtual 
In the digital space, speakers, audiences, and messages exist virtually—
either having no physical existence at all, like the text of a blog, for example, or 
having accessibility primarily by means of a computer, like a video of a court-
room oral argument, where the speakers and courtroom physically exist but the 
video record of the argument is available only on the internet in digital form.92 
Virtuality means that digital messages are not confined to specific contexts for 
consuming them; rather, the rapid circulation of messages on the internet 
means that they can be consumed anytime, anywhere.93 Digital messages can 
exist perpetually outside of their original contexts and beyond control of the 
speakers that generated them, meaning they are polysemic.94 Virtual messages, 
 
87  LOSH, supra note 52, at 63–64. 
88  Bounegru, supra note 81. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  For a more thorough discussion of the novel features of digital rhetoric, see Gurak & An-
tonijevic, supra note 61, at 499–501 (identifying speed, reach, anonymity, interactivity, 
kairos, and collaboration and community as features). 
92  While the lack of physical existence is one way of thinking about what is “virtual,” an-
other is to think of virtuality in terms of relationships. That is, the virtual might “designate[] 
the reality of the relation between substances, a reality that exists only in process, in time.” 
Eric S. Jenkins, The Modes of Visual Rhetoric: Circulating Memes as Expressions, 100 Q. J. 
SPEECH 442, 447 (2014). 
93  See Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 499 (“The Internet allows [messages] . . . to 
be circulated around the world . . . .”). 
94  See Jenkins, supra note 92, at 445. 
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one author suggests, are “collective[] [and] emergent phenomena,” defined by 
the audience’s “manner[] of engagement” with the message, not by an “exami-
nation of distinct texts and contexts.”95 
The virtual nature of digital messages allows for greater public access to 
lawyer commentary and legal documents, extending the reach of these texts.96 
For example, court documents in the United States have nearly always been 
“public,”97 but prior to digitization, “public” meant something very different—
it meant a trip to the courthouse or access to case reporters housed in law li-
braries. Today, the digitization of public records means that if one has a com-
puter, one might have access to the full text of a court document anywhere in 
the world.98 Digital audiences do not need intermediaries like lawyers to “trans-
late” a public record or even provide access; in the virtual environment, public 
audiences can see it, read it, watch it, and consume it themselves. 
 
95  Id. at 443, 452. 
96  See, e.g., Natalie Gomez-Velez, Internet Access to Court Records—Balancing Public Ac-
cess and Privacy, 51 LOY. L. REV. 365, 367 (2005) (noting that “[f]ederal and state courts 
across the country are becoming publicly accessible as never before. Growing reliance on 
computer technology generally and on the Internet specifically, has made the prospect of 
placing court case records and information online via the Internet a reality.”). Another ex-
ample of the widespread availability of court documents online and for free public consump-
tion is Google Scholar, which has an extensive database of Federal and State court opinions 
as well as scholarly literature. See Google Scholar, LAWYERIST, https://lawyerist.com/revie 
ws/online-legal-research-tools/google-scholar [https://perma.cc/56BN-CRJ2] (last visited  
Feb. 25, 2020). Entire current statutory compilations are now found online. See, e.g., FLA. 
LEGISLATURE, THE 2019 FLORIDA STATUTES, www.leg.state.fl.us/STATUTES/ [https://perm 
a.cc/B9YS-66V9] (last visited Feb. 25, 2020). These two examples do not include the exten-
sive for-pay databases that make the whole of United States’ law and many other jurisdic-
tions’ legal documents available to consumers at the touch of a button. See, e.g., Westlaw, 
LAWYERIST, https://lawyerist.com/reviews/online-legal-research-tools/westlaw [https://per 
ma.cc/HF3X-F46V] (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) (describing Westlaw as a site for “compre-
hensive legal research,” and noting that it includes case law and statutes for all 50 states and 
for the United States as well as a “comprehensive secondary sources database”). The United 
States Courts website further notes that “[m]ost documents in federal courts—appellate, dis-
trict, and bankruptcy—are filed electronically . . . [and] [t]he media and public may view 
 most filings.” Accessing Court Documents—Journalist’s Guide, UNITED STATES COURTS,  
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/accessing-court-documents-journalists-guide [htt 
ps://perma.cc/AF3L-ZGQ2] (last visited Feb. 25, 2020). It is common knowledge for law-
yers that prior to the advent of digital data, legal documents were available only in tradition-
al print. 
97  See David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of Practical 
Obscurity, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1400 (“[P]ublic access to court proceedings and rec-
ords is longstanding and deeply ingrained in the American legal system.”). 
98  See, e.g., Search Tips: Which Court Opinions Do You Include?, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, 
https://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/help.html#coverage [https://perma.cc/7ERM-E8 
PW] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (including in its court opinions database the full-text, search-
able, published opinions of “US state appellate and supreme court cases since 1950, US fed-
eral district, appellate, [and other cases] since 1923[,] and US Supreme Court cases since  
1791.”). 
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With respect to lawyer commentary, the same is true. Prior to the digitiza-
tion of legal information and the availability of documents on the internet, to 
get a lawyer’s view on a legal issue, a layperson would have needed an ap-
pointment at a legal office or access to print law materials, many of which 
would have contained primarily technical writing for professional legal audi-
ences not meant for general public consumption.99 Today, however, and largely 
because of the ability to create digital messages, lawyers widely provide educa-
tion and information about the law in digital forms, and those messages are of-
ten written for lay audiences.100 
While this kind of accessibility is positive for creating new opportunities 
for learning and engagement, virtuality also has the downside of making it dif-
ficult for audiences to judge the credibility of messages.101 In the virtual world, 
digital speakers can be anonymous or take on multiple identities.102 Thus, it is 
sometimes difficult for a digital audience member to know who is speaking in 
order to judge the value of the message. In addition, virtuality also makes mes-
sages themselves hard to evaluate because virtual messages are often removed 
in both time and space from their original contexts. That is, a message written 
for another time and set of conditions can persist in its digital form into new 
times and conditions.103 Thus, even more so than with face-to-face or print 
messages, digital messages may be misunderstood. 
Digital speakers also face challenges from the virtual nature of the digital 
communication environment. Unlike the speaker that classical rhetoricians may 
have contemplated, who was likely to know the specifics of his or her audience 
and tailor the message to fit the audience’s needs, virtual audiences in the digi-
 
99  See, e.g., Alvin M. Podboy, The Shifting Sands of Legal Research: Power to the People, 
31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1167, 1183 (2000). Podboy notes that prior to the digitization of legal 
materials, “[t]he law library was a physical place.” Id. It “was a members-only club; it was 
not a place for the general public. . . . The materials were difficult to use. They required ex-
pert understanding and training.” Id. Even after digitization, computerized legal research 
workstations “were originally housed in the law library.” Id. at 1184. He notes that “[t]he 
Internet has . . . destroyed the concept of the [law] library as a place. Through the Internet, 
users have direct access to legal materials. Users can access these materials anytime, any-
where. . . . They do not need special legal skills.” Id. at 1186. 
100  See, e.g., SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com [https://perma.cc/5CFY-ZKK9]  
(providing news and commentary on cases before the United States Supreme Court); see al-
so Sarah Mui, Best Legal Twitter Accounts of 2018, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2018, 12:15 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/best_law_twitter_2018 [https://perma.cc/62 
XC-WCV4]; Stephen Rynkiewicz, Best Law Podcasts of 2018, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2018,  
12:20 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/best_law_podcasts_2018/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/2CV9-RN8A]. 
101  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 31 (discussing the “challenging questions about message 
credibility” because “markers of authorship and expertise are often missing or difficult to 
find”). 
102  See Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 500 (identifying anonymity as a feature of 
digital rhetoric). 
103  See id. (noting that the reach of digital messages “create[s] . . . online communities span-
ning distance and time.”). 
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tal sphere are often unknown to the speaker.104 That is, audiences may be made 
up of countless individuals, each receiving the same message at potentially dif-
ferent times and in different contexts. 
As a result, audiences might receive, use, and recompose messages in ways 
that digital speakers did not and could not have anticipated or intended.105 Alt-
hough traditional print written messages persist beyond the control of the writ-
ers who generated them, in the digital space, virtual persistence presents per-
haps even more intense problems of gatekeeping and information accuracy for 
lawyers making public commentary.106 For example, even if a legal speaker 
knows that information on a legal blog has become stale or is affected by 
changes in the law, that may not be obvious to a consumer of legal information, 
which may lead to misunderstanding. 
B. Speakers and Audiences Interact 
We are living in the age of digital engagement.107 Even though they are 
virtual, speakers and audiences interact with each other in digital spaces; the 
opportunities for interaction in the digital world might even exceed those pos-
sibilities for interaction in the physical one.108 Through chat rooms and com-
ment fields, audiences instantly become speakers, and speakers, audiences. 
Thus, digital audiences are not necessarily passive but instead interact with the 
text in a flattened hierarchy109 between speaker and listener that promotes lis-
 
104  Not being able to know the audience can result in the speaker needing to “project” rather 
than know the audience. See CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL THEORY, supra note 13, at 292. 
Projecting an audience can have negative consequences for the audiences not implied by the 
communication because it excludes potential audience members from its address. Id. at 292; 
see also Philip Wander, The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory, 35 
CENT. STATES SPEECH J. 197, 209 (1984). 
105  In their work on “rhetorical velocity,” Ridolfo and DeVoss implicitly acknowledge the  
virtuality of audiences and the challenges of speakers to anticipate how messages are re-
ceived. “Rhetorical velocity is . . . a strategic approach” to composing a message that en-
courages a speaker to consider “how a text might be recomposed (and why it might be re-
composed) by third parties.” Jim Ridolfo & Dànielle Nicole DeVoss, Composing for 
Recomposition: Rhetorical Velocity and Delivery, 13 KAIROS: J. RHETORIC, TECH., & 
PEDAGOGY (2009), available at http://kairos.technorhetoric.net/13.2/topoi/ridolfo_devoss/ve 
locity.html [https://perma.cc/8UEF-DKMN]. 
106  See, e.g., Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 500 (noting the digital environment’s 
problem of “diminished ability to gatekeep information”). 
107  See, e.g., Justin Ellis, What Happened After 7 News Sites Got Rid of Reader Comments, 
NIEMANLAB (Sept. 16, 2015, 1:48 PM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2015/09/what-happen 
ed-after-7-news-sites-got-rid-of-reader-comments/ [https://perma.cc/C3E6-JADY] (intevie- 
wing Reuters.com executive editor, who said, “I consider us to be in the age of engagement 
right now . . . .”). 
108  See Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 500 (noting that interactivity is a “key fea-
ture of digital communication”). 
109  See id. (noting that interactivity “demands a[] . . . two-way exchange, ending forever the 
Aristotelian, managed approach to keeping audiences in line with the persuasive intent.”). 
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teners to speakers who exert control over messages not originally their own.110 
The control over the rhetorical situation can bring those on the margins to the 
center of the conversation through being able to interact with and reshape the 
text.111 While bringing marginalized voices to the center is a good thing, one 
need only look at the controversies around the disabling of comment fields that 
allow readers to respond to online writing to see instances where audiences of 
digital messages have wrested control of the messages in arguably damaging 
ways.112 
The ability of the audience to respond to the text inevitably changes the 
rhetorical situation in which lawyers publicly address matters of law. When a 
digital message is published for audiences, the interactions between speaker 
and audience in the digital space can change the message repeatedly, creating a 
form of message instability not necessarily present in physical print (or even 
broadcast radio and television) environments.113 This can have both positive 
and negative results. Some comments can lead to greater discussion and debate, 
an effect that serves a democracy built on citizen participation and the rule of 
law.114 On the other hand, aggressive, bullying, or threatening comments to a 
digital speaker can shut down conversation and debate, a result inconsistent 
 
110  See id. (“Internet users are expected to interact with information . . . until the final prod-
uct no longer resembles the original.”). 
111  See, e.g., Filippo Trevisan, Using the Internet to Mobilize Marginalized Groups: People 
with Disabilities and Digital Campaign Strategies in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, 13 
INT’L J. COMM. 1592, 1592 (2019) (discussing mobilization and inclusion of citizens with 
disabilities in campaign discourse); see also the work of Sarah Jackson, Moya Bailey, and 
Brooke Foucault Welles, who describe their research as directed toward “how and why 
Twitter hashtags have become an important platform for historically disenfranchised popula-
tions to advance counter narratives and advocate for social change.” NE. U.: NULAB FOR 
TEXTS, MAPS, & NETWORKS, #Hashtagactivism: Networked Counterpublics in the Digital 
Age, https://web.northeastern.edu/nulab/hashtagactivism-networked-counterpublics-in-the-d 
igital-age/ [https://perma.cc/E7BL-8SVL] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). The project began as a 
NULab project and was released in print by MIT Press on March 10, 2020. See SARAH J. 
JACKSON ET AL., #HASHTAGACTIVISM: NETWORKS OF RACE AND GENDER JUSTICE (2020). 
112  See, e.g., Farnoush Amiri, YouTube to Disable Comments on Most Videos That Include  
Minors, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2019, 12:18 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-n 
ews/youtube-disable-comments-most-videos-including-minors-n977821 [https://perma 
.cc/AL9C-U4FG]; Ellis, supra note 107. But, bringing those on the margins to the center can 
have a positive impact on inclusion for marginalized populations. See, e.g., Trevisan, supra 
note 111, at 1592 (discussing mobilization and inclusion of citizens with disabilities in cam-
paign discourse). 
113  See Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 500 (“Internet users are expected to interact 
with information, even to transform [messages] until the final product no longer resembles 
the original.”). 
114  See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free 
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498 (2011) (connecting free expression of ideas to 
democratic self-governance and noting that “[t]he opportunity for each citizen to participate 
in the speech by which public opinion is formed is . . . vital to the legitimacy of the entire 
legal system.”). 
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with the goals a citizen lawyer would have in engaging in public commentary 
about legal issues.115 
C. Messages Have Greater Circulation, Range, and Speed 
Digital rhetoric scholars say that speed of circulation is perhaps the domi-
nant feature of digital communication.116 In other words, messages circulate 
with greater velocity and reach numerically more and more-diverse audiences 
than one could reach with print or even television or radio.117 While the speed 
of circulation increases the reach of messages, this velocity pressures digital 
speakers to spend less time creating and composing messages and instead focus 
on quickly distributing short bits of information as fast as possible to as many 
audiences as possible.118 
This high-speed circulation lends itself to action, not contemplation,119 
which can present a competency challenge for lawyers as public commentators. 
While lawyers may not have an enforceable ethical duty to be competent as 
public commentators,120 there is an implicit responsibility to be thoughtful and 
accurate commentators when educating the public about the law and advocat-
ing for legal reform.121 At minimum, a lawyer’s reputation can turn on the 
quality of her public communications, and there is risk of an inverse relation-
ship between the pressure to quickly produce information and to provide 
thoughtful, deliberative opinions on legal issues confronting society.122 
 
115  See, e.g., Jaime Loke, Readers’ Debate a Local Murder Trial: “Race” in the Online 
Public Sphere, 6 COMM., CULTURE & CRITIQUE 179, 179 (2013) (examining the rhetoric of 
6,000 comments on news articles about a murder trial, which included racist and bigoted 
rhetorics). 
116  See, e.g., Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 499. 
117  See id. at 500. 
118  Id. (discussing how the reach of digital messages puts pressure on speakers to generate 
lots of messages without as much attention to their structure or logic); see also Ridolfo & 
DeVoss, supra note 105 (discussing the need for digital speakers to anticipate how their 
messages might be repurposed by audiences of digital messages). 
119  See Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 500 (noting that “nonhierarchical distribu-
tion” is a feature of the internet and that persuading becomes less important than simply 
reaching many audiences on the internet). 
120  Rule 1.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provide that “[a] lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2019) (emphasis added). By its language, this Rule does not apply to a citizen lawyer 
engaged in public commentary. See id. 
121  The responsibilities to “cultivate knowledge of the law” and “further . . . public[] under-
standing” of the law carry with them an implicit expectation that the lawyer will do so with 
effort to be accurate and thoughtful. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. no.6 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2019). 
122  On the question of deliberative versus intuitive thinking in the context of legal analysis, 
see Kirsten K. Davis, “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated”: Reading and 
Writing Objective Legal Memoranda in a Mobile Computing Age, 92 OR. L. REV. 471, 494–
95 (2013). 
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Moreover, circulation speed creates a perceived sense of immediacy of the 
speaker’s performance of a message, and any “lag time” between writing and 
reading associated with print media seems to disappear in digital spaces.123 
That is, speakers and audiences appear to be active in the same rhetorical situa-
tion at the same time, but the reality is that they are probably not.124 As Kath-
leen Welch writes, the electronic context has the “attractiveness of . . . 
liveness,”125 meaning that we are drawn to digital media because humans value 
the relationships of “live,” real-time, simultaneously experienced interactions, 
and, in digital media, it is possible to feel that an interaction between speaker 
and audience is contemporaneous even when it is not. 
Imagine asking a question to a lawyer on Avvo.com. Avvo provides on its 
site “[f]ree Q&A with attorneys.”126 Avvo states that “[e]very 5 seconds some-
one gets free legal advice from Avvo.”127 Individuals are invited to ask a ques-
tion, which is posted anonymously.128 All users, not just those who ask ques-
tions, can see recently asked questions and lawyers’ answers to those 
questions.129 Avvo reports that people have asked 191,015 questions.130 
Avvo’s Q&A service and its description rhetorically crafts a sense of im-
mediacy between the person asking the question and the lawyer answering. 
This immediacy extends even to those audiences for the questions and answers 
(i.e., someone looking for an answer to their own legal question) who are read-
ing the questions and answers long after they are published together on Avvo’s 
website. 
Although questions and answers are not necessarily contemporaneously 
generated,131 the questions and answers are presented as if the inquiring person 
and the lawyer are engaged in a conversation about the individual’s problem. 
Moreover, readers can respond to those answers, rating the answers with a 
 
123  Kathleen E. Welch, Electrifying Classical Rhetoric: Ancient Media, Modern Technology, 
and Contemporary Composition, 10 J. ADVANCED COMPOSITION 23, 26 (1990). 
124  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 76 (noting that the internet “collapse[s]” the distinctions of 
the traditional rhetorical situation and noting the immediacy of Twitter, which is “more as a 
continuous stream than a discrete conversation.”). 
125  Welch, supra note 123, at 26. 
126  AVVO, https://www.avvo.com/ask-a-lawyer [https://perma.cc/W2AJ-JHVD] (last visited  
Mar. 9, 2020). 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  See for example the divorce Q&A page, which displays recently asked questions and 
answers from lawyers. AVVO: DIVORCE, https://www.avvo.com/topics/divorce[https://perma. 
cc/9U4C-HD3S] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). The ability of others to read the answers to 
questions is one way that the contributions lawyers make on Avvo.com are as much “com-
mentary” as they are individual client “advice.” 
130  Id. 
131  On Avvo, for example, a question generated on October 28, 2019, about a divorce issue 
was answered the next day by two different attorneys. See AVVO, https://www.avvo.com/le 
gal-answers/are-there-risks-in-me-signing-a-quit-claim-deed-if-4666858.html [https://perma 
.cc/4SJR-KDWH] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
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thumbs-up or thumbs-down, which further suggests other audience members’ 
participation in the interaction.132 These rhetorical performances, although 
chronologically distant, appear immediate to each other, connected in both time 
and place. Imagine, for example, if the same questions were answered in a print 
newspaper column. An individual would have to submit a question and then 
wait for the answer to appear in next week’s paper. Nothing appears “live” in 
the context of print commentary, but in the digital context, messages can circu-
late so quickly they appear as contemporaneous interactions. 
Even more interesting to the questions of circulation and immediacy is the 
service Facebook Live. Facebook Live is a “live video streaming service that 
lets [users] broadcast from their mobile devices straight to their Facebook 
News Feed.”133 According to online reviews and marketing materials, Face-
book Live allows users to “essentially . . . meet[] [with followers] in person, 
since the event is happening ‘face-to-face’ and in real time. Facebook Live 
gives [users the] chance to show there are real, caring humans [involved], 
which in turn builds trust . . . .”134 In addition, the live session can be recorded 
and posted to get “in front of a larger but still relevant audience.”135 
Facebook Live offers a digital platform that takes advantage of digital 
rhetoric’s immediacy and circulation in all its forms. It attempts to replicate 
face-to-face interaction in a virtual space (even though the speaker cannot nec-
essarily see the faces of audience members) while also extending the reach of 
the interaction by implementing rapid circulation of the recorded message to 
larger audiences. Because it is designated as “live,” however, even in its rec-
orded form, the message still can appear immediate and contemporaneous. 
For lawyers speaking to the public in digital spaces, the speed and range of 
message circulation along with the ability of those messages to have a sense of 
immediacy present both opportunities for public engagement and challenges to 
accuracy of message, as the above discussion suggests. 
D. Digital Messages Facilitate Invention but Challenge Memory 
In the digital world, messages are easily remixed and recombined.136 This 
access to more resources for thought, argument, and influence can improve 
 
132  On Avvo, for example, generated on October 29, 2019, in response to a question about a 
divorce issue was rated “thumbs up” (helpful) twice by anonymous raters. Id. Lawyers can 
also indicate whether they “agree” with the advice given in the answer. Id. 
133  Sophia Bernazzani, How to Use Facebook Live: The Ultimate Guide, HUBSPOT, https:// 
blog.hubspot.com/marketing/facebook-live-guide [https://perma.cc/8PC7-BRAM] (last  
visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
134  Margot Whitney, The Ridiculously Awesome Guide to Facebook Live, WORDSTREAM 
BLOG, https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/07/31/facebook-live-guide (last updated  
Nov. 28, 2018). 
135  Id. 
136  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 72 (noting the “malleability of digital work” and that “dig-
ital work can be easily manipulated and remixed”); Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 
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speakers’ inventive capacities while at the same time challenge both speakers’ 
and audiences’ abilities to remember what they have heard and seen and to 
make sense of those messages. 
For digital speakers, creating digital texts is social and involves interac-
tions with other texts.137 Moreover, creating messages is at least in part an ac-
tivity of remixing and recombining message fragments made available for use 
in other digital texts.138 This is because “more elements and others’ elements 
[are] much more readily available to mix, mash, and merge.”139 Theorizing dig-
ital rhetoric means thinking about how one might “select[] ready-made works 
and reconstitut[e] them into new works.”140 
Think of the hyperlinks141 in a legal blog that include hypertext,142 for ex-
ample. Those hyperlinks represent pieces of information that are simultaneous-
ly part of and outside of the blog’s text; the blog content relies in part on the 
hyperlinked information for its own creation.143 Another example is a video 
montage on YouTube (e.g., a compilation of news outlets covering a story or of 
funny cat videos) that combines bits and pieces of other videos to re-present 
information that has already been presented in another form or through other 
media.144 In a similar way, legal commentators on a recent court case might 
pull information from the court case, other court cases, and other commentators 
into their own writing or speaking. In each of these instances, the speaker’s in-
ventiveness comes not only from speaker’s internal resources and thoughts but 
 
500 (noting that audiences are expected to “transform texts . . . until the final product no 
longer resembles the original.”). 
137  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 77. 
138  See id. at 131–32 (describing “[a]ppropriation and editing” as composition practices in 
digital rhetoric). 
139  Ridolfo & DeVoss, supra note 105. 
140  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 70. 
141  “Hyperlink” means a “word, phrase, or image that you can click on to jump to a new 
document or a new section within the current document.” Hyperlink, TECHTERMS, https:// 
techterms.com/definition/hyperlink [https://perma.cc/QT74-6CMW] (last visited Feb. 19,  
2020). 
142  “Hypertext” means “text that links to other information.” Hypertext, TECHTERMS, https:// 
techterms.com/definition/hypertext [https://perma.cc/G5NK-YX63] (last visited Feb. 19,  
2020). 
143  See Jay L. Gordon, Teaching Hypertext Composition, 14 TECHNICAL COMM. Q. 49, 55, 
57 (discussing the hyperlink in hypertext documents and suggesting that the hyperlink can 
serve many purposes in digital documents); Wendy Morgan, Heterotropes: Learning the 
Rhetoric of Hyperlinks, 2 EDUC., COMM., & INFO. 215, 216 (2002) (noting hyperlinks are 
“necessary to the reading of . . . hypertext and do much to create meaning.”); see also Davis, 
supra note 122, at 512 (noting that “[r]eading on-screen generally involves more browsing, 
scanning, and reading selectively . . . , [a problem] exacerbated by hypertext presentation of 
the material on screen.”). 
144  See, e.g., America’s Funniest Home Videos, 101 SUPER Weird Cats/AFV Funniest Cat 
Videos 2018, YOUTUBE (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5qHfyk3VT 
vM [https://perma.cc/K2CR-3VY2] (compiling videos of cats that had appeared the televi-
sion show Funniest Home Videos as submitted by the show’s viewers). 
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also from his or her ability to marshal and recombine information from other 
sources. 
In many ways, lawyers should be well-suited for writing public commen-
tary in the digital space. Lawyers are trained to synthesize cases, quote statutes, 
marshal facts—that is, they are trained to identify and use the law and facts as 
resources for new thoughts and arguments.145 Legal scholar James Boyd White 
identifies the lawyer’s behavior of finding those legal and factual fragments as 
a performance of Aristotle’s original definition of rhetoric: using the ability to 
identify all the available “means of persuasion.”146 In the digital environment, 
then, lawyers come with a rhetorical orientation toward the text that is already 
attuned to using existing messages to create new ones. 
For both speakers and audiences, the sheer volume of digital messages 
raises a question about the ability to remember what is seen and read digitally. 
For remembering the content of digital texts, memory is not so much the ca-
pacity that an individual has to remember information but more of an individu-
al’s willingness to engage in an activity that requires persistence.147 To remem-
ber the endless flow of digital content that appears on their screens, both 
speakers and audiences must build and maintain patterns to organize the digital 
information that comes at them in bits and pieces.148 They must be able to stay 
focused, sort information into categories, discard irrelevant information, and 
evaluate the credibility of sources, all while taking in information that is deliv-
ered at rapid speed, in various forms, and often all at the same time (e.g., a 
news feed that provides a video news brief while at the same time providing 
additional information at the bottom and sides of the screen). To compose mes-
sages that make use of existing messages, speakers, like audiences, must also 
be able to persist in organizing and remembering the information that will be 
used to build a new message.149 
In sum, digital rhetoric is rhetoric that is mediated electronically or through 
computers.150 As a rhetorical genre, it has features that set it apart from other 
 
145  See Standard 302: Learning Outcomes, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES 
OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, at 15 (2019-2020), available at https:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_
the_bar/standards/2019-2020/2019-2020-aba-standards-chapter3.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL 
6L-V4UB] (“A law school shall establish learning outcomes that shall, at a minimum, in-
clude competency in the following: (a) Knowledge and understanding of substantive and 
procedural law; (b) Legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem-solving, and writ-
ten and oral communication in the legal context . . . .”). 
146  James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Com-
munal Life, 52 U. CHIC. L. REV. 684, 689 (1985). 
147  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 72. 
148  See id. (noting Brooke’s definition of memory as “the ability to build and maintain pat-
terns, although those patterns may be tentative and ultimately fade into the background . . . 
persistence is a practice of bricolage”). 
149  Ridolfo & DeVoss, supra note 105 (“[W]riting often requires composers to draw upon 
multiple modes of meaning-making.”). 
150  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 17. 
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rhetorical genres: its speakers, audiences, and messages exist in a virtual world, 
and speakers and audiences have the capacity for rapid interaction that sets dig-
ital media apart from print or broadcast. Digital messages tend to circulate at a 
higher speed and with further reach than print messages, and messages can be 
used as resources by speakers to invent new messages that may challenge both 
speakers and audiences to remember and make sense of the messages they 
compose and hear. 
Classical rhetorical theory can inform digital rhetoric and has been repeat-
edly applied in that context.151 Although digital rhetoric presents challenges not 
familiar to the ancients, digital rhetoric still involves inventing, delivering, or-
ganizing, remembering, and composing messages meant to influence others.152 
These five activities are the five parts of the classical rhetorical canon.153 Ac-
cordingly, the Article now turns to an initial exploration of lawyer digital 
commentary as a function of classical rhetorical theory. This Part considers 
what questions we might ask by examining lawyer public commentary through 
digital rhetoric and what perspectives citizen lawyers might adopt when per-
forming as digital rhetors. This Part is not meant to explore or resolve every 
issue but rather to draw attention to the conundrums and possibilities that exist 
for citizen lawyers who want to persuade and influence in a digital world.154 
III. EXPLORING LAWYER PUBLIC COMMENTARY THROUGH THE LENS OF 
CLASSICAL RHETORICAL THEORY 
When Cicero looked at the Greek texts to write his own guide for practic-
ing rhetoric in the Roman Republic, he had a specific goal in mind: 
Cicero aimed at acquainting his generation with the best that had been thought 
and said on the subject of rhetoric; and not content with the scholastic teaching, 
he return[ed] to the fountain-heads, to Plato and Aristotle, Isocrates[,] and The-
ophrastus, and with their work as a basis he attempt[ed] a new synthesis, select-
ing, combining[,] and extending [what had already been written about rheto-
ric].155 
This Part takes a Ciceronian perspective and attempts the Ciceronian task: 
it combines ideas from classical rhetorical theory with ideas about a lawyer’s 
 
151  See, e.g., id. passim; WELCH, supra note 72, passim. 
152  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 61–79 (discussing these topics). 
153  See id. (organizing his discussion of digital rhetoric around the five classical rhetorical 
canons to show how classical rhetorical theory has been applied). 
154  The western rhetorical canon is not without its detractors who rightly point out that the 
canon itself excluded other voices, including those of women, see, e.g., CHERYL GLENN, 
RHETORIC RETOLD: REGENDERING THE TRADITION FROM ANTIQUITY THROUGH THE 
RENAISSANCE 1–2 (1997), and that legal scholars should decenter reliance upon the western 
rhetorical canon in legal education to the benefit of non-western rhetorics. See, e.g., Teri A. 
McMurtry-Chubb, Still Writing at the Master’s Table: Decolonizing Rhetoric in Legal Writ-
ing for a “Woke” Legal Academy, 21 SCHOLAR 255, 274 (2019). 
155  MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 150 (quoting J.W.H. ATKINS, LITERARY CRITICISM IN 
ANTIQUITY, at I1.26 (1952)). 
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engagement with digital public commentary. Looking to the work of digital 
rhetoric scholars who first identified some of these connections between classi-
cal and digital rhetoric,156 this Part makes some observations about how law-
yers’ digital public commentary might connect to classical rhetoric. 
A. The Transformative Potential of Style and Delivery 
In the digital sphere, language mediates experience and meaning is radical-
ly subject to the contexts in which communications are received. The digital 
sphere—and the actions of speakers within it—reflects the contingency, situat-
edness, and transformative potential that the Sophists157 considered to be the 
human condition. 
In ancient Greece, the Sophists recognized the transformative potential of 
language.158 The Sophists thought that truth in human interactions was contin-
gent, dependent upon context, and open for transformation through language 
and argument.159 In Encomium of Helen, for example, the Sophist Gorgias said, 
“[s]peech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible 
body effects the divinest works.”160 Here, Gorgias was discussing the invisibil-
ity of the rhetorical techniques that operate within language itself to persuade, 
influence, and transform. 
To transform digital audiences with messages, speakers must be able to 
command attention in the digital sphere, and “[t]he devices that regulate atten-
tion are stylistic devices.”161 The classical advice on style can be helpful in 
thinking about attention-getting. Style was a subject of the rhetorical canon.162 
Aristotle, for example, devoted multiple chapters in On Rhetoric to style and 
stylistic devices.163 Cicero did, too.164 These discussions encourage readers to 
 
156  See, e.g., COLLIN GIFFORD BROOKE, LINGUA FRACTA: TOWARD A RHETORIC OF NEW 
MEDIA 27 (2009) (“[W]e can turn to the [classical] rhetorical canons to construct a rhetoric 
that will allow us to both understand and produce interfaces.”); EYMAN, supra note 52, at 
62–76 (reviewing application of classical rhetorical canons to digital rhetoric); WELCH, su-
pra note 72, at 7 (discussing her adaptation of “Isocratic Sophistic theories” of digital rheto-
ric); Ian Bogost & Elizabeth Losh, Rhetoric and Digital Media, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF RHETORICAL STUDIES 759 (Michael J. MacDonald ed., 2017) (discussing interaction be-
tween classical and digital rhetoric). 
157  The Sophists were teachers of rhetoric in ancient Greece and included Protagoras and 
Gorgias, among others. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 37, 40. 
158  See, e.g., THE RHETORICAL TRADITION, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing Gorgias’s 
“strongest possible case for the power of language” in Encomium of Helen). 
159  See, e.g., id. at 22. For a specific example, see [ANONYMOUS], DISSOI LOGOI, which 
showed how to explore all possible sides of a question by presenting opposing arguments. 
Id. at 48–55 (reproducing the translation that appears in T.M. ROBINSON, CONTRASTING 
ARGUMENTS: AN EDITION OF THE “DISSOI LOGOI” (1979)). 
160  Id. at 45 (reproducing George A. Kennedy translation). 
161  LANHAM, supra note 74, at xi. 
162  See infra notes 163, 164 (discussing Aristotle and Cicero as examples). 
163  See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE bk. III (George A. 
Kennedy trans., 2d ed. 2007) (discussing the canon of style).  
20 NEV. L.J. 1137 
1164 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
think of style not as ornamentation but as the way in which “ideas are embod-
ied in language and customized to communicative contexts.”165 
As this Article has demonstrated, the digital sphere is a new context for 
persuasive communication style. Eyman notes that “[s]tyle takes on new im-
portance for digital rhetoric, particularly in terms of visual style: for . . . digital 
rhetoric, style is equivalent to ‘design.’ ”166 Understanding this connection be-
tween style and design opens up new avenues for speakers to command atten-
tion in digital spaces: “document design, including color, font choice, and lay-
out, as well as multimedia design possibilities,”167 are all available means of 
persuasion in the digital world.168 In the digital public sphere, effective style 
helps garner attention to one’s message in an environment where “[a]ttention is 
the commodity in short supply.”169 
A specific example of an attention-sustaining stylistic device borrowed 
from classical rhetoric that connects to today’s modern digital environment is 
the aphorism. Protagoras, a Sophist, valued aphorisms—the “precise and pithy 
phrases” that capture ideas “in a few words.”170 Examples of an aphorism in-
clude “[p]ride goeth before a fall” and “[t]he simplest questions are the hardest 
to answer.”171 Today, we might call these aphorisms examples of “writing 
short”—writing that is brief but effective such as a tweet or a headline.172 The 
aphorism’s instructive capacity is in the audience’s unpacking of the phrase.173 
In the digital world, however, the aphorism has additional value in its ability to 
increase audience engagement. By trying to unpack the meaning of a tweet, for 
example, by reflecting on it and connecting it to other tweets in a thread, the 
audience is engaging with the message and focusing attention on it. 
 
164  See, e.g., CICERO, ON THE IDEAL ORATOR (DE ORATORE) bk. III (James M. May & Jakob 
Wisse trans., 2001) (discussing style). 
165  EYMAN, supra note 52, at 70 (quoting Gideon O. Burton, Silva Rhetoricae: Style, availa-
ble at http://rhetoric.byu.edu/Canons/Style.htm [https://perma.cc/8DUV-LTGF] (last visited  
Mar. 29, 2020)). 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  For discussions on legal document design in digital contexts, see among others, Ellie 
Margolis, Is the Medium the Message? Unleashing the Power of E-Communication in the 
Twenty-First Century, 12 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 1, 15–21 (2015); Ruth Anne Robbins, 
Painting with Print: Incorporating Concepts of Typographic and Layout Design into the 
Text of Legal Writing Documents, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 111–14 
(2004); see also Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson, Telling Through Type: Typography and Narra-
tive in Legal Briefs, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 87, 88, n.2 (2010) (listing a 
number of sources relevant to legal document design). 
169  LANHAM, supra note 74, at xi. 
170  MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 39. 
171  Aphorism, LITERARY DEVICES, https://literarydevices.net/aphorism [https://perma.cc/3 
J58-ZGZ6] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
172  ROY PETER CLARK, HOW TO WRITE SHORT: WORD CRAFT FOR FAST TIMES 6–7 (2013). 
173  MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 39. 
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The need to get and sustain attention in the digital public sphere makes the 
classical canon of delivery relevant to the digital environment. Not only does 
attention-getting evoke the rhetorical canon of style, it also draws on the canon 
of delivery. Ancient rhetoricians thought about delivery primarily in terms of 
“volume, change of pitch . . . , and rhythm”174 as well as “facial expression, 
tone of voice, and gesture.”175 Even though Aristotle preferred that persuasion 
“contend by means of facts themselves,” he thought attending to delivery was 
necessary because it had “great power.”176 Cicero added that delivery “is the 
one dominant factor in oratory. Without it, even the best orator cannot be of 
any account at all . . . .”177 
Ancient rhetoricians considered delivery in terms of ethos (credibility) and 
pathos (emotion) and considered how body language and gestures might create 
universal modes of understanding.178 For example, Cicero said that emotions 
are often “confused” in speech but can be “especially” and “prominent[ly]” ex-
pressed through delivery: “every emotion has its own facial expression, tone of 
voice, and gesture. The entire body of a human being, all the facial expressions 
and all the utterances of the voice, like the strings on a lyre, ‘sound’ exactly in 
the way they are struck by each emotion.”179 
Classical rhetoric explored delivery in physical, not virtual, spaces, but the 
detailed exploration of delivery in classical texts still may provide a way to 
think about delivery in the digital space, particularly because digital speech 
evokes a “secondary orality” where the oral features of speech exist in a literate 
(written) environment.180 The classical teachings on delivery might encourage 
citizen lawyers to think about how to represent their bodies digitally, for exam-
ple, in videos or avatars.181 Commentators can think about the speaking speed, 
vocabulary use, and tone with which they deliver a podcast182 as a means for 
 
174  ARISTOTLE, supra note 163, at 195. 
175  CICERO, supra note 164, at 292; see also QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA, at bk. 11, ch. 
6, § 14 (Harold Edgeworth Butler ed., 1922), available at, https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/ 
hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0069%3Abook%3D11%3Achapter%3D6 
[https://perma.cc/S5QB-BAR6] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (placing voice and gesture in the  
canon of delivery). 
176  ARISTOTLE, supra note 163, at 195–96. 
177  CICERO, supra note 164, at 290. 
178  See Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 502 (discussing ancient rhetoricians’ treat-
ment of delivery). 
179  CICERO, supra note 164, at 292. 
180  See supra Part II. 
181  See Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 504. In multiuser 3-D virtual environments, 
“speaker and audience come together without regard for physical distance; but, in those en-
vironments, speaker and audience still come together with regard to the communicative as-
pects of virtual bodies and, hence, with an increased regard to digital delivery.” Id. In addi-
tion, “YouTube and other sites provide[] an entirely new, open, and inexpensive way for 
people to create powerful video messages that are accessible to millions.” Id. 
182  “When we look at effectiveness and excellence in delivery, the voice undoubtedly plays 
the most important part.” CICERO, supra note 164, at 295. 
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reaching and keeping the attention of their audiences through emotional en-
gagement. Attention to delivery may in fact be the best way to improve connec-
tion with remote and diverse audiences in the digital sphere because, as Cicero 
said: 
[W]ords only affect those who are joined to the speaker by the bond of a shared 
language . . . . But delivery, which displays the feelings of the soul, affects eve-
ryone, because everyone’s soul is stirred by the same feelings, and it is through 
the same signs that people recognize them in others and reveal them in them-
selves.183 
Classical rhetorical principles can give citizen lawyers a way to imagine 
“standing before” the audience when the audience is not there to provide im-
mediate feedback on the message or to see physical non-verbal cues. 
B. An Ethos for Digital Audiences 
For lawyers who normally interact with their traditional “legal” audienc-
es—judges, juries, and clients—through either face-to-face interactions or writ-
ten texts for which the message’s audience members are known, the inability to 
know the digital audience presents thorny problems. Lawyers commentating on 
issues of public concern likely do not know the exact audience members they 
are seeking to influence or how, exactly, to tailor messages to meet the needs 
and interests of the potentially diverse and multiple audiences for the message. 
To engage digital audiences, ethos, or the way in which a speaker is seen 
as having good character, competence, and goodwill,184 is of the utmost im-
portance. “[F]or the majority of online information[,] . . . ethos is simply the 
most powerful and important of the classical appeals, the one that holds up best 
and is most explanatory of the bulk of digital rhetoric.”185 In other words, when 
speakers and audiences are invisible to each other and time is short to evaluate 
information, audiences may be particularly inclined to substitute a speaker’s 
perceived credibility for other ways to evaluate the quality of a message (e.g., 
looking at the message’s logical structure and content accuracy). 
But, thinking of ethos as only the credibility of the speaker is too limited a 
view for explaining ethos’s function in the digital environment: 
In digital rhetoric, it is the ethos of the message in its entirety—not just the au-
thor but the power of the visuals, the sound and style of the text, the speed with 
which it was delivered, the people to [whom] it was sent, the connection it may 
have to others who have credible online reputations—that is the key element.186 
 
183  Id. 
184  See ARISTOTLE, supra note 163, at 112–13. 
185  Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 501. 
186  Id.; see also EYMAN, supra note 52, at 31–32 (discussing ethos in digital rhetoric and the 
way in which it extends beyond the speaker). 
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In other words, digital audiences evaluate a message’s credibility through more 
than the message’s logical value alone and ethos through more than a speaker’s 
personal reputation alone. 
Aristotle’s writings on ethos suggest that he agreed that ethos was much 
broader than the reputation the speaker brought to the rhetorical situation; Aris-
totle said that ethos “result[s] from the speech, not from a previous opinion that 
the speaker is a [particular] kind of person.”187 In other words, the entire con-
text of the speaking situation contributed to the formation of the speaker’s 
ethos. Accordingly, citizen lawyers speaking in the digital public sphere should 
consider how messages themselves convey their individual ethos as speakers. 
This is why style, as discussed above, for example, is important for citizen 
lawyers wanting to influence members of the public. Style not only grabs atten-
tion in digital spaces, it also works to convey ethos. 
Both Cicero and Quintilian had ideas about ethos relevant to digital com-
mentary. Quintilian was a lawyer and rhetorical scholar during the Roman Em-
pire, when the practice of rhetoric was largely confined to legal speech in the 
law courts of Rome and to the education of Roman citizens (in part as a means 
of enculturation of conquered peoples).188 That is, when tyrants came to rule 
Imperial Rome, citizens stopped practicing the habits of self-governance that 
had been part of life in the Roman Republic.189 The Empire no longer valued 
the creative rhetorical process and instead preoccupied itself with rhetorical ed-
ucation on matters of style.190 It was in this context that Quintilian was chal-
lenged to think deeply about the ethos of the “perfect” or “ideal” orator.191 
Quintilian’s characterization of the ideal public speaker’s characteristics or 
ethos was revolutionary for his time—and is applicable to citizen lawyers. 
Quintilian concluded that a public speaker needed both eloquence (“con-
summate ability in speaking”) and good moral character (“excellence of 
mind”).192 One could not be an orator and be of poor character.193 Quintilian’s 
ideal orator was “publicly active, possessed of both integrity and eloquence, 
constantly learning, and courageous in pursing his ideals.”194 Quintilian high-
 
187  ARISTOTLE, supra note 163, at 39; see also William Benoit, Isocrates and Aristotle on 
Rhetoric, 20 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 251, 257-58 (1990) (discussing Aristotle’s approach to 
ethos). 
188  See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 182–86 (discussing the Roman Empire and the life 
of Quintilian). 
189  Id. at 185. 
190  See id. at 184. 
191  Id. at 187 (describing Quintilian as working toward the “perfect orator”). 
192  QUINTILIAN TEACHING SPEAKING & WRITING, supra note †, at 6. In other translations, 
this language is provided as “possession of exceptional gifts of speech” and “excellences of 
character.” See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 187. 
193  See QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTES OF ORATORY, supra note 59, at 413. 
194  MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 187. 
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lighted that the orator needed to be wise to be a true orator.195 As Quintilian re-
flected, “[I]t is one of the greatest misfortunes of ignorance to fancy that who-
ever offers instruction is a [person] of knowledge.”196 
The orator needed to be able to tell the difference between virtue and vice 
and act with prudence and discernment. Importantly, Quintilian said that the 
orator must be sincere, consistent in thought and speech: 
[A] bad [person] must of necessity utter words at variance with his [or her] 
thoughts; while to good [people], on the contrary, a virtuous sincerity of lan-
guage will never be wanting, nor (for good [people] will also be wise) a power 
of producing the most excellent thoughts, . . . since whatever is said with honest 
feeling will also be said with eloquence. 
. . . . 
Will not an orator have to speak much of justice, fortitude, abstinence, temper-
ance, and piety? Yet, the good [person], who has a knowledge of these virtues, 
not by sound and name only, not as heard merely by the ear to be repeated by 
the tongue, but who has embraced them in his [or her] heart, and thinks in con-
formity with them, . . . will express sincerely what he [or she] thinks.197 
Key to Quintilian’s “ideal orator ethos” is his expectation that an orator is 
one who is engaged in the world as an active citizen, addressing matters of 
public concern.198 In distinguishing the “philosopher” from the “orator,” Quin-
tilian said: 
Which of the philosophers, indeed, ever frequented courts of justice, or distin-
guished [themselves] in public assemblies? . . . But I should desire the orator, 
whom I am trying to form, to be a kind of Roman wise [person], who may prove 
himself a true states[person], not by discussions in retirement, but by personal 
experience and exertions in public life.199 
Quintilian’s “ideal orator ethos” provides a model for lawyers performing 
as citizen lawyers with a special responsibility for educating and influencing 
others about the law. Looking at the question of ethos from Quintilian’s per-
spective, a lawyer making public commentary in digital spaces might develop 
the ethos of the ideal orator in all aspects of his or her message. The lawyer’s 
messages should be well-researched, thoughtful, and referenced to demonstrate 
wisdom. In addition, demonstrations of sincerity of the commentator’s state-
ments can be a governing principle; in other words, the rhetorical choices the 
commentator makes can be designed to demonstrate the commentator is sin-
cere, delivering consistent messages, and fulfilling the responsibility to act on 
behalf of interests other than his or her own.200 
 
195  Id. (noting Quintilian’s reference to wisdom); see also QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTES OF 
ORATORY, supra note 59, at 422. 
196  QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTES OF ORATORY, supra note 59, at 422. 
197  Id. at 416, 420. 
198  See id. at 419. 
199  Id. 
200  The lawyer’s role as a “representative of clients” can pose a challenge to developing a 
“sincere” ethos in public life because sometimes a client’s representation may conflict with a 
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Moreover, in the digital environment, the style of presentation, who en-
dorses a citizen lawyer’s commentary, and with whom the lawyer affiliates all 
tell the audience something about the sincerity of the lawyer speaking. Even 
the advertisements that scroll alongside a lawyer’s blog entry, for example, are 
the kinds of contextual cues—even if unintentional—that would inform an au-
dience about the sincerity of the lawyer’s commentary. 
While Quintilian helps citizen lawyers in the digital space think about 
ethos, Cicero’s rhetorical theory helps lawyers imagine those invisible digital 
audiences as communities of listeners. Cicero argued that it was not wisdom, 
religion, or even law that held social communities together; instead, Cicero ar-
gued, public speaking—eloquence and oratory—held communities together: 
[W]hat other force could have gathered the scattered members of the human 
race into one place, or could have led them away from a savage existence in the 
wilderness to this truly human, communal way of life, or, once communities had 
been founded, could have established laws, judicial procedures, and legal ar-
rangements?201 
For Cicero, audiences become communities when messages are unifying, 
when groups of people pay attention to a text that organizes them around a 
common set of ideas. 
For lawyer commentators in a digital space, commentary itself has the 
power not only to hold communities together but also to create them through 
messages that hold their attention.202 A digital speaker has the benefit of reach-
ing an unlimited number of people and the possibility to create a community of 
interest from them—if the lawyer is sufficiently eloquent to grab their atten-
tion. Cicero’s idea that speakers can “unify humanity” and “maintain civiliza-
tion” through speech should be empowering to a citizen lawyer who wants to 
broadly share his or her message about improving the law, promoting the rule 
of law, and furthering the values of participatory democracy.203 
 
lawyer’s views as a citizen lawyer. See, e.g., Helen A. Anderson, Legal Doubletalk and the 
Concern with Positional Conflicts: A “Foolish Consistency”?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 36–
46 (2006) (discussing the problems of sincerity, credibility, and positional conflicts when 
lawyers take conflicting positions on behalf of different clients). Given lawyers’ increasing 
access to public audiences for their messages, the topic of how to best balance the identities 
of “representative of clients” and “citizen lawyer” deserves research and scholarly attention 
because the conflict between a lawyer’s public commentary and clients’ interest is emerging 
as a potential conflicts of interest matter. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 
370(II)(A)(ii) (Nov. 2016) (relying on ABA Model Rule 1.7(b)(4) to warn of the potential 
for unethical conflicts of interest between lawyer’s social media comments and client’s in-
terests). But see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) 
(“[R]epresenting a client does not constitute approval of the client’s views or activities.”). 
201  CICERO, supra note 164, at 65. 
202  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 44 (digital rhetoric’s primary activities include the “poten-
tial for building social communities”). 
203  Cicero’s view of citizen-orators as community builders can be compared with Elizabeth 
Losh’s view that government orators work to establish a “virtualpolitik” in the digital sphere 
that preserves their own power rather than empowering citizens to create communities 
around which the state is organized. LOSH, supra note 52, at 19. 
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For the citizen lawyer, making digital public commentary means develop-
ing an ethos for one’s self and one’s messages. It means addressing the ques-
tion of who the lawyer is in the digital public sphere and recognizing that ethos 
is not confined only to the speaker but includes the messages’ visual, textual, 
and contextual features. Finally, it means considering not only the speaker’s 
eloquence but also the speaker’s character—paying attention to Quintilian’s 
“public duty” of projecting a good moral character as a public speaker,204 one 
who speaks sincerely, and one who, in Cicero’s eyes, helps to maintain social 
communities. 
C. The Connection of Kairos to Circulation 
In the digital public sphere, because of the rapid circulation and indefinite 
storage of digital messages, a speaker may never know when or how a message 
is used, changed, or reappropriated.205 On the other hand, as discussed above, 
this quick movement of messages creates a sense of immediacy between 
speaker and listener in that it “erodes the distance between rhetor and reader, 
producer and user.”206 Paradoxically, then, audiences can feel unknown and 
distant but at the same time can seem like they are very familiar and close. This 
dualism that disrupts notions of time and space in the digital sphere renews the 
importance of the classical concept of kairos.207 
Kairos is the classical rhetorical concept that messages can be offered at 
the right “time,” in “opportune” moments, or with the right “fit” for an occa-
sion.208 The speed at which messages move in the digital space requires citizen 
lawyers to be especially sensitive to kairos in the sense that messages have the 
“right” timing.209 In the digital space, not only do opportune moments to offer 
public commentary come and go quickly, they also arise more frequently for 
citizen lawyers as new rhetorical situations emerge.210 Because messages rapid-
ly circulate, “where the same topics might not have otherwise inspired [a] re-
sponse, [the digital space may expect one] in part due to [digital] features of 
 
204  See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 3, at 187 (noting that Quintilian’s “concept of goodness 
is close[ly associated] to the Stoic ideal of ‘public duty,’ ” meaning “active public life is re-
quired”). 
205  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 91–92 (noting that “circulation is the principle mechanism 
. . . for adding use-value to the rhetorical object via its reproduction, appropriation, and use 
within a particular circulation ecology or . . . across multiple circulation ecologies.”). 
206  Id. at 69. 
207  See Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 501. 
208  See THE RHETORICAL TRADITION, supra note 1, at 69 (associating Isocrates with the con-
cept). Rhetoric scholar John Poulakos defines rhetoric using the concept of kairos: “Rhetoric 
is the art which seeks to capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and at-
tempts to suggest that which is possible.” John Poulakos, Toward a Sophistic Definition of 
Rhetoric, 16 PHIL. & RHETORIC 35, 36 (1983). 
209  See Gurak & Antonijevic, supra note 61, at 501 (noting kairos “can be used . . . to create 
interest and action around a topic.”). 
210  Id. 
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speed, reach, and interactivity.”211 So, a citizen lawyer sensitive to kairos will 
ask questions like: Is this issue too stale for commentary? Has the moment for 
influence passed? Would it be appropriate to comment on these issues in this 
forum? 
The flip side of this, however, is that digital environments arguably extend 
the kairos of messages. A message is more likely to be perceived of as kairotic 
(i.e., offered at the right time and fitting for the occasion) because the moments 
at which the speaker and the audience appear to be engaged with each other 
(even when they are not) are more frequent.212 If digital audiences can engage 
lawyer commentary on demand (such as through a Google search), then the 
“right time” for that commentary is the exact time the audience seeks out the 
message. For example, a citizen lawyer writing a blog about the propriety of a 
new state supreme court opinion has multiple moments of kairos to consider. 
The lawyer must consider whether a blog entry is published at the right mo-
ment for commenting on a case and also whether the entry is a fitting response 
for future audiences and future contexts. 
D. The Possibilities of Invention and Proof for Public Commentary 
The digital environment’s tendency toward enabling message remixing of-
fers challenges to lawyers engaged in digital public commentary. Lawyers writ-
ing in public must be aware that the texts they compose can be remade and re-
used by other speakers who may not honor the original intent of the 
commentary. But, the volume of digital messages also offers possibilities for 
expanding citizen lawyers’ creativity in making effective public arguments. In 
the digital public, lawyers can make arguments that are not constrained by rules 
that normally apply to legal arguments in traditional legal spaces, like the rules 
of evidence or rules of procedure. Instead, lawyers can be creative in how they 
use already-circulating messages as effective appeals and proofs. Classical 
rhetoric in the form of Cicero’s teachings on invention and Aristotle’s instruc-
tion on proof of argument can be applied to help explore the possibilities of ef-
fective argument for lawyers in the public sphere. 
Cicero’s model of invention was based on finding materials for argument 
and establishing relationships between them.213 Cicero emphasized the speak-
er’s ability to use materials already circulating in culture as a resource for in-
vention.214 That is, a speaker could use all the materials available—facts, doc-
uments, and physical evidence—in combination with a method for identifying 
 
211  Id. 
212  See supra Section II.C (discussing circulation of digital messages and immediacy). 
213  See EYMAN, supra note 52, at 65 (noting scholars who see Cicero as a “shift from Aristo-
telian ‘discovery of inferential connectives to the discovery of materials for arguments’ ”). 
214  See id. 
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issues (i.e., stasis doctrine215)—to generate arguments. Contemporary scholars 
see Cicero’s theory of invention as a “process of discovery” that is well-suited 
for explaining how arguments are invented in digital spaces.216 That is, Cice-
ro’s work supports the idea that “[i]nvention, as a function of digital rhetoric, 
includes the searching and negotiation of networks of information[] [and] seek-
ing those materials best suited to creating persuasive works . . . .”217 
Rapidly circulating digital messages serve as resources for invention. For 
citizen lawyers, this reality might mean a conscious reorientation from the 
ways in which lawyers think about what counts as “law,” “facts,” or “evi-
dence.” In the digital world, lawyers can seek out new and different materials 
to incorporate into their arguments. They can invent arguments not only by 
drawing upon archives of digital data but also through social media interactions 
and new networks of connection.218 By expanding their ideas about what might 
count as inventive resources, such as videos, blogs, or tweets, lawyers may be 
more inventive in the methods by which they build and express public com-
mentary. 
Moreover, citizen lawyers’ messages to the public may be more kairotic, 
fitting for their times and occasions, because the messages are built with an 
awareness of the audiences’ larger context for understanding those arguments. 
This context may include the reuse of circulating messages that are, at least in 
part, produced by the same audiences that will hear the lawyer’s message. By 
looking to already circulating messages to build “new” commentary, lawyers 
can construct arguments that fill the spaces between other arguments already in 
circulation. 
If a commentator looks not only inward for arguments but, like Cicero, 
looks outward, the influence of commentary lawyers make to the public about 
issues of social concern may be more creative and powerful. Moreover, digital 
fragments of all types become new resources for lawyers in influencing public 
views on law and matters of justice. 
An example for thinking about new ways to persuade public audiences by 
reconfiguring other digital messages is the internet meme. An “internet meme” 
is a phenomenon of the digital world, and the term relies on Richard Dawkins’s 
original term “for a cultural replicator that gets passed from human to human 
via imitation.”219 Memes are messages about an “idea, behavior, style, or usage 
that spreads from person to person within a culture” or “an amusing or interest-
ing item (such as a captioned picture or video) or genre of items that is spread 
 
215  Stasis is a method for thinking introduced by Cicero that “involve[s] anticipating likely 
points of conflict.” See HERRICK, supra note 3, at 96–97 (discussing Cicero’s ideas of stasis). 
216  EYMAN, supra note 52, at 66. 
217  Id. 
218  See id. at 67–68 (discussing these concepts of invention in the digital spaces). 
219  Jenkins, supra note 92, at 446. 
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widely online especially through social media.”220 Memes are made up of visu-
al or textual fragments, or both, of other messages.221 
The meme is arguably representative of Aristotle’s concept of enthymeme. 
Aristotle defined the enthymeme as a “kind of syllogism,”222 or an argument 
from probable premises, some of which may not be stated.223 Aristotle’s writ-
ings suggest that for popular audiences, arguments that are built on premises 
that are difficult to follow or are obvious can remain unsaid.224 
For lawyers writing as public commentators, creating memes offers anoth-
er potential strategy for informing and persuading digital audiences about legal 
issues of common concern without stating all the premises—or even the con-
clusions—of arguments. Memes might be thought of, in classical rhetorical 
terms, as enthymatic arguments; that is, they present a conclusion or an insight 
through a specific image with or without text, but they do not state their prem-
ises. In other words, the foundations for the argument asserted in the meme are 
implicit, and the audience can supply those foundations by drawing upon their 
own meanings and experiences.225 The enthymeme is effective as argument, 
Aristotle suggests, because it avoids being too long or “stating what is obvi-
ous.”226 Instead, using enthymemes allows speakers to draw upon what the au-
dience “know[s] and instances near their experience. . . . [T]he fact that what is 
said seems true should be clear to all or most people [in the audience].”227 By 
combining both images and text drawn from other messages in circulation, 
lawyer commentators can draw new conclusions that might be highly effective 
in getting audiences’ attention in the digital sphere. 
Googling “legal memes” generates largely humorous, tongue-in-cheek 
memes.228 But, for the purposes of citizen lawyers’ digital public commentary, 
humor would not be the point of the meme. Instead, the “public commentary” 
meme would be meant to educate, persuade, or inform audiences229 about seri-
 
220  Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meme [http 
s://perma.cc/VG76-YM8U] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
221  Jenkins, supra note 92, at 446 (noting that “a meme is a fragment”). 
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[https://perma.cc/Z4ZY-RT9B] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020), a Pinterest board of humorous  
memes about lawyers. 
229  Jenkins suggests that it is the “mode” of the meme, or its site as a place of “interfacing 
between text and audience,” that gives the meme its meaning. Particularly regarding images, 
the circulation of the image results in “different identifications and affections.” Jenkins, su-
pra note 92, at 443, 445. This analysis supports the idea that a meme can educate, inform, 
and persuade. 
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ous, timely legal issues. What might an informative or educational legal meme 
be? 
The Center for Story-Based Strategy (Center) provides an example of what 
a “public commentary” meme might be. Each year, the Center gives awards for 
the best social justice memes.230 Winning memes must “challenge the status 
quo, shape politics and culture (small ‘p’ and small ‘c’), and have a viral ‘it’ 
factor, reaching significant scale.”231 One meme to recently win the award was 
an image (without text) that the Center titled “Face [M]asks & California 
[W]ildfires” meme.232 The meme related to the intensification of wildfires in 
California in recent years, and the primary image was a picture of seven 
people, including men, women, and children, walking through smoky haze in a 
city, each wearing a face mask to protect themselves from the smoke.233 The 
Center said this about the meme’s image: 
This year, familiar skylines choked by fire’s haze made the headlines in the U.S. 
The simple N95 face mask was a container for how connected we are to 
otherwise-distant catastrophe. The masks also hold the meaning of community 
mutual aid, as they were often the most immediately-useful resource shared to 
mitigate the impact of the smoke. Combine with scenes of suburban devastation 
in a place once thought immune to the immediate effects of climate change, and 
we have a meme that begins to represent humanity’s stakes in the climate 
crisis.234 
Arguably, also built into this meme is a potential legal argument about 
climate change, social welfare, and the need for laws that both reverse the pro-
gress toward climate destruction and protect individuals from the dangers of 
climate change. Through an image—people wearing masks during the Califor-
nia wildfires—viewers participate in constructing an argument based upon un-
spoken premises and even an unspoken conclusion a citizen lawyer might want 
the audience to draw: humans are killing the planet, and we need to change 
laws to stop that process and protect our fellow humans. 
For lawyers as public commentators, memes enlarge the possibilities for 
image-centered logical argument to digital audiences whose time is limited and 
who may be less likely to engage with lengthy text-based arguments.235 Using 
memes as public commentary on legal topics might reach audiences not willing 
to pay attention to textual ones. Memes could let audiences fill in some of the 
underlying argument premises themselves based on their own experiences, 
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which could broaden the appeal of the meme to audiences that might not be 
known or predicted. 
The danger, of course, for lawyers using memes (or any other image) as 
commentary is that the meme, as an image, is subject to unexpected interpreta-
tions and multiple meanings.236 There is always a risk—more so than with text-
based commentary—that an audience will not “fill-in” the premises that the cit-
izen lawyer wanted or expected. Accordingly, citizen lawyers may be reluctant 
to cede that control to their audiences in an environment where lawyers are 
regularly held ethically responsible for the honesty of their communications.237 
A misinterpreted message perhaps presents a danger to this ethical norm while 
at the same time being the best way to reach an audience about a legal matter of 
public concern.238 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers have a professional responsibility to perform as citizen lawyers 
and speak to educate and inform the public about issues of law, rule of law, and 
participation in democratic government. The digital public sphere is the way 
lawyers are most likely to reach those audiences, so to be influential in those 
spaces, citizen lawyers should understand digital rhetoric and its features and 
begin to develop a revised rhetorical perspective for public engagement in digi-
tal environments. 
This Article presented an initial and brief exploration of how classical rhe-
torical theory might offer a new perspective on citizen lawyers’ rhetorical prac-
tices. First, classical rhetoric can help citizen lawyers think about their stylistic 
and delivery choices in the digital environment. Second, classical rhetoric, with 
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sional Conduct, dishonesty is widely prohibited in a variety of contexts. See MODEL RULES 
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its central emphasis on audience, can help legal commentators develop an ethos 
that establishes both the speaker’s and the message’s credibility. By consider-
ing Cicero’s work, lawyers can imagine their audiences as communities of lis-
teners and themselves as an integral part of participatory democracy, something 
that should be of central importance to the citizen lawyer. 
Third, classical rhetoric offers ways for citizen lawyers to think about the 
rhetorical implications of a message’s circulation speed as a function of kairos. 
Kairos lets digital speakers conceptualize whether their responses to rhetorical 
situations are timely and appropriate. In the digital space, kairos enables speak-
ers to imagine how that fittingness can extend beyond original conceptions be-
cause of the internet’s ability to create more opportunities for immediacy be-
tween speaker and audience. 
Finally, classical rhetoric provides perspective on inventing and proving 
arguments in the digital public sphere. The ability to recombine messages in 
the digital space encourages citizen lawyers making public commentary to 
think more deeply about how arguments are constructed both textually and vis-
ually and how other digital materials can be reused and remixed. By doing so, 
citizen lawyers might find new ways of influencing public audiences that build 
on classical argument forms, such as the enthymeme, but transform those ar-
guments into something new and perhaps more influential than before. 
